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The cloud computing services have gained popularity in both public and enterprise domains 
and they process a large amount of user data with varying privacy levels. The increasing 
demand for cloud services including storage and computation requires new functional elements 
and provisioning schemes to meet user requirements. Multi-clouds can optimise the user 
requirements by allowing them to choose best services from a large number of services offered 
by various cloud providers as they are massively scalable, can be dynamically configured, and 
delivered on demand with large-scale infrastructure resources. A major concern related to 
multi-cloud adoption is the lack of models for them and their associated security issues which 
become more unpredictable in a multi-cloud environment. Moreover, in order to trust the 
services in a foreign cloud users depend on their assurances given by the cloud provider but 
cloud providers give very limited evidence or accountability to users which offers them the 
ability to hide some behaviour of the service.  
In this thesis, we propose a model for multi-cloud collaboration that can securely establish 
dynamic collaboration between heterogeneous clouds using the cloud on-demand model in a 
secure way. Initially, threat modelling for cloud services has been done that leads to the 
identification of various threats to service interfaces along with the possible attackers and the 
mechanisms to exploit those threats. Based on these threats the cloud provider can apply 
suitable mechanisms to protect services and user data from these threats. In the next phase, we 
present a lightweight and novel authentication mechanism which provides a single sign-on 
(SSO) to users for authentication at runtime between multi-clouds before granting them service 




the best services from multiple cloud providers that closely match user quality of service 
requirements (QoS). The scheduling mechanism achieves high accuracy by providing distance 
correlation weighting mechanism among a large number of services QoS parameters.  
In the next stage, novel service level agreement (SLA) management mechanisms are proposed 
to ensure secure service execution in the foreign cloud. The usage of SLA mechanisms ensures 
that user QoS parameters including the functional (CPU, RAM, memory etc.) and non-
functional requirements (bandwidth, latency, availability, reliability etc.) of users for a 
particular service are negotiated before secure collaboration between multi-clouds is setup. The 
multi-cloud handling user requests will be responsible to enforce mechanisms that fulfil the 
QoS requirements agreed in the SLA. While the monitoring phase in SLA involves monitoring 
the service execution in the foreign cloud to check its compliance with the SLA and report it 
back to the user. Finally, we present the use cases of applying the proposed model in scenarios 
such as Internet of Things (IoT) and E-Healthcare in multi-clouds. Moreover, the designed 
protocols are empirically implemented on two different clouds including OpenStack and 
Amazon AWS. Experiments indicate that the proposed model is scalable, authentication 
protocols result only in a limited overhead compared to standard authentication protocols, 
service scheduling achieves high efficiency and any SLA violations by a cloud provider can be 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the motivation, context, aim and objectives of this research. These 
include introducing the concept and benefits of multi-clouds, as well as the key challenges in 
achieving multi-cloud communication and security. Moreover, this chapter also details the key 
research contributions of this research, including the development of a novel model for 
achieving dynamic and secure collaboration among multi-clouds. Finally, this chapter presents 
an overall organisation of this thesis.    
1.2 Research Context 
Cloud computing is a technology that offers various services ranging from infrastructure to 
storage, computation, software and application over the internet. However, the variety and 
proliferation of services offered by the cloud provider raises several challenges. These 
challenges include portability issues of SaaS on various IaaS and PaaS platforms, 
interoperability of distributed SaaS applications on various cloud platforms, PaaS dealing with 




diverse platforms [1]. The concept of multi-clouds was introduced to solve these challenges. A 
multi-cloud environment is dependent on multiple clouds, so a user can be reliant on cloud 
services from AWS, Microsoft, or OpenStack which are communicating. Among all cloud 
environments including public, private, hybrid, heterogeneous and hybrid clouds the co-
operation between multi-clouds has been desired by many cloud users and executives. A survey 
from 451-Microsoft [2] mentions that organizations are increasingly seeking cloud providers 
that can deliver a wide range of service, and be their brokers as a single point of contact through 
which they can access services from other providers. It is predicted that by the end of 2019 
90% of the UK businesses will be using at least one cloud service [3]. 
The motives for multi-cloud for cloud provider can vary from dealing with a peak in service 
requests, having backup servers to diminish downtime scenarios and enhancing its own offers 
to get a market competitive edge. The main incentive for organizations in multi-clouds can be 
to optimise cost by having better access to services, and the ability to act as an intermediary to 
provide access to resources. While users can be tempted to use multi-clouds as it gives them 
benefits like consume services not delivered by their own cloud provider, using services 
irrespective of location and share resources with users in other clouds. In this thesis, we refer 
to cloud making a connection request to an external cloud as a “local cloud”. While a “foreign 
cloud” is referred to as a cloud to which the user needs access and collaboration has to be 
established with it.  
Multi-clouds offer greater agility, innovation, and more intense collaboration and they are 
predicted to become an industry norm, however, managing service orchestration is still an open 
issue [4]. In a multi-cloud environment, providers spread out their services across multiple 
cloud providers which changes the traditional cloud landscape. Therefore, advanced 




cloud services running smooth. Along with the service orchestration issues in multi-clouds, 
many security concerns are also related to their adoption and application.  
Cloud providers in a multi-cloud environment spread out their services across multiple clouds 
which changes the traditional cloud landscape and brings more security challenges. Cyber-
attacks, in general, have been on the rise in the past few years, and the adoption of multi-clouds 
provides attackers with an even larger attack surface to gain access to sensitive data, 
applications, services and infrastructure [5]. This poses a threat not only to companies and 
enterprises using the cloud but also to government and security organizations using cloud 
computing. The parties involved in compromising cloud can vary from hackers to cloud 
administrators as well as malicious users, service providers and cloud providers. 
1.3 Problem Description 
Single cloud data centre which is the standard cloud computing model can pose several 
challenges to providers and users such as unavailability of service to thousands of customers if 
a single service goes down, and lower throughput due to high traffic. Multiple clouds provide 
the ability to run workloads on best-suited platforms, avoiding the need to migrate legacy 
applications and creating redundancy to avoid vendor lock-in [6]. Multi-clouds offer a way for 
dynamic collaboration between various clouds in a way that there is no former agreement 
between participating clouds and collaboration is established at runtime according to 
requirements [7].  
Service orchestration is a key challenge in multi-clouds. The collaborating multi-clouds are 
hosted by different companies and their heterogeneous policies, security rules and internal 




multi-clouds are not suitable for dynamic collaboration as they are expensive, while some 
solutions require credential conversion across different cloud realms. Centralised protocols 
with fixed collaboration relationships are not suitable due to delay in processing large number 
of requests and huge costs incurred due to this delay. Therefore, a new scheme is required that 
could allow dynamic multi-party collaborating among different clouds. 
Authentication between multi-clouds is the initial stage in setting up communication across 
them. Collaborating multi-clouds are independent and usually belong to different security 
realms which makes authentication a very complex problem. Having different security policies 
and the need of credential conversion across different realms requires calling a chain of 
middleware services to perform authentication. The basic authentication solutions that exist for 
traditional networks fail to meet the need for a dynamic collaboration of clouds and services in 
multi-cloud. This research focuses on providing a novel mechanism for dynamic authentication 
between multi-clouds in varying security realms by setting up multi-party collaboration 
sessions that neither require credential conversion nor the series of invocations to setup 
authentication in advance to clouds interactions. This leads to improving the scalability of the 
system by handling a large number of requests is less time and thus incurring lower costs 
compared to the state-of-the-art authentication protocols. 
After a service has been moved to a foreign cloud, the cloud users have no mechanism to verify 
that the service they are using is trustworthy and neither do they have insights on what is 
happening with their data being handled by services. In order to trust the cloud services, users 
depend on their assurances given by cloud provider. Cloud providers give very limited 
evidence or accountability to users which offers them the ability to hide some behaviour of the 
service. These issues necessitate the need to develop solutions for multi-clouds that can 
facilitate multi-cloud collaboration and provide guarantees to the user that the software or 




violate the agreed service level agreements (SLAs). Therefore, a key challenge is to develop 
solutions for multi-cloud that can enable the users to select most suitable service provider 
among multiple foreign clouds according to their requirements through scheduling and to aid 
resource provisioning and placements in the foreign cloud. The scheduling algorithm must 
support efficient discovery according to the characteristics of services advertised by foreign 
clouds and user QoS requirements with high accuracy, and also select an optimum service in 
case there is no match of advertised services with QoS requirements. Moreover, another key 
challenge is to ensure that services in foreign cloud are compliant with the service level 
agreement (SLA) between user and cloud provider. While the user is accessing service in 
foreign cloud, the functional and non-functional QoS requirements defined in the SLAs should 
be managed by the proposed system. 
1.4 Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to design and develop a novel mechanism that ensures secure and 
dynamic collaboration across the multi-clouds by managing their orchestration, authentication, 
and scheduling on the basis of service level agreements. 
The primary objectives of this research are as follows: 
1. To investigate and identify the current state-of-the-art mechanisms in a multi-cloud 
collaboration, orchestration, authentication and SLA management.  
2. To design and assess a comprehensive threat model for the cloud services in the face of 
untrusted cloud nodes, malicious users, operating systems, and applications operating 




3. To propose and implement a novel protocol that can be used to achieve secure 
authentication and authorisation for multi-cloud collaboration with improved 
performance. 
4. To design and develop an efficient and dynamic service scheduling algorithm for the 
selection of cloud services in the multi-cloud scenarios based on the partial or closest 
matching of QoS attributes.  
5. To design and develop a service level agreement (SLA) based mechanism to ensure 
that the service execution in a foreign cloud complies with the negotiated SLA 
parameters. 
1.5 Research Contributions 
The major contributions of this research are the following: 
a. We developed a threat model for services in the cloud. It provides identification of the 
threats to cloud services and the methodologies that could be used by attackers to 
exploit those threats. This model can be used to determine threats for key service 
functionalities including authentication, data computation and data storage in relation 
to the cloud architecture and service interfaces. This threat model can be used to 
determine potential threats in relation to a foreign cloud architecture in which user will 
be accessing services. 
b. A novel model is proposed for establishing dynamic collaboration in multi-clouds so 
that users can securely access services in foreign clouds as per their requirements. The 




components that enable secure and dynamic multi-cloud collaboration are presented 
with experimental results. 
c. To facilitate dynamic authentication between multi-clouds we have proposed 
lightweight protocols and techniques based on single-sign-on (SSO) property. These 
authentication protocols have been formally verified using BAN Logic [8] and achieve 
better performance than traditional authentication protocols. 
d. The proposed MCC model has been extended to support efficient scheduling among 
multiple clouds by doing service selection according to partial or closest matching of 
user quality of service (QoS) requirements with high accuracy.  
e. The service level agreement (SLA) based mechanisms in MCC have been developed to 
facilitate secure service execution in a foreign cloud. This includes setting up SLA 
negotiation, enforcement and monitoring which helps in negotiating required service 
QoS parametres, enforcing mechanisms in a foreing cloud that can ensure that the 
functional and non-functional requirements agreed in the SLA can be satisfied, and 
monitoring service execution in the foreign cloud and reporting back any case of SLA 
violation to the user. 
1.6 Thesis Organisation 
This thesis is organized as follows:  
• Chapter 2 presents a detailed review of the state-of-the-art research and existing 
methodologies related to multi-cloud collaborations and security to identify the 
research gaps, critical issues and limitations in the existing techniques of multi-cloud 




context of issues such as authentication, service selection and service level agreement 
(SLA) management in multi-clouds. 
• Chapter 3 presents a detailed analysis of security threats to services in cloud computing. 
These security threats are analysed along with the methodologies that can be used to 
exploit these threats. A conceptual analysis is performed to how identified threats can 
affect various functionalities of services in cloud. Moreover, a generic model is 
proposed that can be used to determine possible threats, attacks and their impact on a 
specific service functionality. 
• Chapter 4 presents a model for setting up secure collaboration between multi-clouds 
according to user requirements. In this framework, a novel authentication mechanism 
is proposed that is efficient, scalable and can authenticate users from a foreign cloud 
without prior agreement between communicating clouds. The proposed protocols for 
communication and authentication are formally and empirically verified. 
• Chapter 5 extends the model proposed for multi-cloud collaboration to achieve an end 
to end solution for secure communication. Initially, a scheduling mechanism is 
proposed for efficient service selection that is used to choose best multi-cloud 
environment that can satisfy user quality of service (QoS) requirements among multiple 
providers. After selecting a foreign cloud provider, service level agreements (SLAs) are 
negotiated between the client and foreign cloud provider, and provider implements 
techniques that can facilitate service execution according to the agreement, and finally 
monitoring is performed to check if the service execution in foreign cloud satisfies 
client requirements agreed in the SLA. 
• Chapter 6 summaries the research carried out and major contributions of this research 




• Appendix A shows the use cases of the proposed model and explains its applications in 
domains such as Internet of Things (IoT) and E-Healthcare in multi-clouds. Moreover, 
we present the benefits of using proposed model with each of these applications. The 





Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the literature review on cloud computing and security issues pertaining 
to the domain of multi-clouds. A comprehensive survey of existing research mechanisms for 
multi-cloud collaboration, authentication, service selection and service level agreement 
management (negotiation, enforcement and monitoring) is presented. Furthermore, we 
highlight the limitations with existing research solutions and discuss the critical requirements 
for this research work. 
2.2 Cloud Computing  
Cloud computing – an emerging popular paradigm; is a gradual evolution of various interlacing 
technologies, [9, 10] enabling an organization’s ubiquitous access to shared and globally 
distributed pools of higher-level computing services which are accessible exactly when they 
are needed. The aim of cloud computing is to better utilize the distributed resources; remotely 
placed together, to grab maximum throughput and to combat large-scale computational 
problems. The main features of could computing are visualization [11], scalability [12], 
interoperability [13], fail-over mechanism [14], quality of services [15] and its 




services in terms of infrastructure, platform and software (IaaS, PaaS and SaaS respectively); 
being based on SOA offering everything as service (XaaS).  
2.2.1 Service Models 
Cloud computing offers on-demand access to the combined capacity of remote, shared and 
globally distributed resources for a pay-per cycle basis [17]. The cloud service architecture 
comprises of three main service models; Infrastructure as a Service, Platform as a Service and 
Software as a service (IaaS, PaaS and SaaS respectively) [18]. These models provide increased 
abstraction between the cloud client and pool of shared resources by offering an on-demand 
access exactly in need.  
2.2.1.1 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)  
Infrastructure as a Service refers to the deployment of computing infrastructure; hardware 
(servers, storage and networks) with their associated software (OS, Virtualization tools and 
filesystem) as a Service to the cloud client. It avoids the capital expenditure for having set up 
an extensive infrastructure rather using it all together at the time of need on pay per cycle basis.  
The main advantages of IaaS are cost-effectiveness, on-demand availability, secure 
environment provision (especially for digital forensics and malware analysis), suitability for 
multi-platforms organizations (Computer, Mobile accesses), portability and interoperability of 
infrastructure. Amazon Secure Storage Service (S3) and Web Services Elastic Compute Cloud 
(EC2) [19], ServePath’s GoGrid [20], Rackspace Cloud [21], Oracle Cloud Computing [22], 
GigaSpaces [23], RightScale [24] and Nimbus [25] are examples of IaaS.   
2.2.1.2 Platform as a Service (PaaS)  
Platform as a Service refers to the deployment of on-demand software development 
environment for the developers as a service. It includes; toolkits, developing environments and 




programming language execution environment, database management system and web servers 
are offered as service. The programmers can develop and run their applications on a cloud 
based platform without the cost and complexity of buying the underlying hardware and 
software. The main advantages of PaaS services are; deployment of an updated development 
environment, reduced cost, fully tested development toolkits and faster uptime. The example 
of PaaS offerings are Google App Engine [26], Microsoft Azure [27] and Oracle Cloud 
Platform [28].  
2.2.1.3 Software as a Service (SaaS)  
Software as a Service refers to the on-demand availability of application software and databases 
for the cloud users, charged on a pay-per-use basis or using a subscription fee. The cloud users 
do not need to deal with the underlying complexity or place where the applications run rather 
they are provided with software as a service exactly when they need it. Similar to IaaS and 
PaaS, SaaS also provides scalability, reduced cost, easy handling, secure application usage, fast 
and portable work, and interoperability. The maintenance, updating, upgrading, security are 
purely provider’s concerns.  
2.2.2 Security in Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing emerged as a popular paradigm due to its high-quality services with low cost 
and enhanced performance. Its widespread adoption due to its flexible infrastructure and ease 
of access is a hallmark of its prevalence.  Besides its service diversity utilities, security has 
become a major concern which aggravates the issues related to users’ privacy as well as cloud’s 
quality of service (QoS). In this section, a detailed overview on the security of cloud services 




2.2.2.1 Software as a Service (SaaS) Security 
In Software as a Service (SaaS), the cloud provider is solely responsible for security provision 
while a cloud user is just supposed to work on the application [29-31]. Therefore, the cloud 
provider must prevent multiple users from seeing each other’s data [32]. The traditional on-
premises systems stored the user’s data in the same promises i.e. physically secured but when 
it comes to cloud computing, the user’s data is stored on the provider’s cloud. Even in private 
clouds, the data is stored with other users’ data (at the same place).  
As SaaS applications are deployed over the web, web-security [33] becomes a major concern 
in SaaS security. The users are mostly concerned with confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of the SaaS applications. There are certain tests and security measures that can help to validate 
the data security in SaaS and prevent the cloud from issues including XSS, Cross-site request 
forgery (CSRF), Access control issues, OS issues, Cookies and hidden fields manipulations, 
SQL injections, Insecure storage and configuration. In Amazon Web Services [19], the network 
layer must combat the traditional security attacks [34] of Man-in-the-middle, IP-Spoofing, Port 
scanning and spoofing, ARP tunnelling and spoofing, Phishing and Botnet execution. For 
users’ data privacy various encryption and privacy preserving techniques been proposed for 
clouds.  
2.2.2.2 Platform as a Service (PaaS) Security 
Platform as a Service (PaaS) offers deployment of on-demand software development 
environment without capital expenditure of setting up and maintaining the underlying hardware 
and software layers [35]. Being a cloud service model, it depends mainly on a secure and 
reliable web browser and networking. PaaS security has two sub-layers; the security of 
deployed users’ applications and the security of PaaS itself [36]. PaaS providers are meant to 




PaaS has major data security concerns associated with it.  PaaS third-party related security 
inherits could include Mashups’ issues [37] as PaaS offers these third-party web-service 
components alongside traditional programming languages [35-38]. As PaaS users’ community 
comprises of main developers, so a cloud-based secure application development is a major 
security concern for them and System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) [39, 40] must be 
followed during application development.  
2.2.2.3 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Security  
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) offers deployment of infrastructure; virtual hardware (servers, 
networks and storages) and their associated software as an on-demand service [39]. IaaS users 
can run any software with full management and better control over the allocated resources [41] 
especially in VMs [42]. They are solely responsible for security policies configurations [43] 
but the underlying complex infrastructure is controlled by cloud providers. IaaS; being an 
integral part of the cloud platform has some security issues. The main feature of IaaS is 
infrastructure-virtualization as it offers IaaS users to manipulate (copy, share, migrate, create 
and roll-back) with VMs [44, 45] but it is vulnerable for attackers due to extra layer; needs to 
be secured [46]. VM security is as important as physical machine security [47]. Security is a 
major challenge as more entry-points are created in VMs [48]. VMs share the system resources 
on the same server; security of each VM may be compromised in this regard if there is a 
malicious VM [46] as VMs communication is possible using cover channels and bypassing 




2.3 Multi-Clouds  
After a decade of progress, cloud computing has appeared as the buzzword on the IT landscape 
due to its widespread adoption and architectural flexibility. With the advent of the internet, 
computing grew up swiftly from standalone to distributed, to cluster, to grid and then to cloud. 
The evolving and emerging cloud computing trends and directions have been discussed in 
discussed in research [49]. The multi-clouds have been stated as the evolving computing 
architecture. Multi-clouds are considered as a single heterogeneous architecture offering on-
demand services from multiple cloud providers [50]. Traditionally, the multi-clouds were 
meant to leverage resources from widespread data centres but gradually applications were 
hosted to utilize resources [51, 52].  
2.3.1 Benefits and Strength 
With multi-clouds, a user can distribute a single workload between two IaaS providers, or can 
place single workload on one of IaaS providers and backup on the other; the user is free to 
transit between them. Multi-clouds have various benefits over single clouds. Various cloud 
providers have worldwide data centres and a single provider cannot have data centres in every 
administrative region and country [53], rather there are some legal geographical requirements 
for data storage as well. Therefore, to gain access across such widespread data centres multiple 
clouds providers can be utilized.  
For single clouds various service-outages’ cases have been reported. A popular among them 
was the Amazon’s data centre failure after which Amazon encouraged the use of multiple data 
centres for fault tolerance [54]. Outsourcing services from multiple clouds and the ability to 
freely workload transition can facilitate a cloud user avoiding the vendor lock-in and 




policy or pricing [54]. Multi-clouds utilization ensures better overall quality of services as in 
terms of load-balancing, cost-reduction, flexibility, interoperability and scalability.  
2.3.2 Obstacles and Challenges 
Multi-clouds are being utilized and adopted very swiftly. However, certain obstacles need to 
be combatted. For example, common APIs facilitating multi-clouds are supposed to 
responsible for resources offered by different providers. The network and storage abstractions; 
different across the providers, let the multi-cloud adoption fit for each application instead of 
using a generic one. The price and billing mechanisms and policies are mostly different across 
providers, so multi-cloud adoption needs to put hard efforts to develop a multi-cloud 
application. Same is the case with management tasks (e.g., load balancing, fault tolerance, 
resource management etc.). Libcloud2 and jClouds are examples of APIs alleviating these 
challenges.  
2.3.3 Types of Multi-Clouds 
Multiple clouds can be categorized as hybrid and multi-clouds. A multi-cloud can be a hybrid 
cloud by combining either public and private clouds or IT infrastructure. A hybrid cloud 
basically combines two cloud deployment models; public and private [51, 52]. Hybrid clouds 
are used to cater sensitive data [55]. However, there are certain challenges in setting up hybrid 
clouds including latency, network topologies and bandwidth [56]. A multi-cloud is a single 
heterogeneous structure bringing various cloud services from different providers under the 
same umbrella. This encourages services and resources provision, applications’ 
interoperability and portability and vendor lock-in avoidances [53, 57]. Multi-clouds are further 




2.3.4 Multi-Clouds Collaborations 
Multi-clouds – collaboration or federation refers to the integration of multiple clouds providers’ 
services under the same collaborative or federated umbrella. Cloud computing is being evolved 
day by day through intensive researches. This evolution can be understood through various 
subsequent stages of how multiple clouds collaboration evolved. Initially, at stage 1, there were 
only monolithic clouds; independent proprietary cloud architecture based services, then at stage 
2, there were vertical supply chain clouds/ hierarchal multi-clouds, and at stage 3, there are 
horizontal federated clouds/ cross cloud federation [58]. The terms inter-clouds, multi-clouds 
and clouds federation have been mostly used interchangeably in the literature. More preciously, 
the term ‘cloud of clouds’ is referred for them.  
Various standardization bodies have defined federation as following; ENISA; which is known 
as the European network and information security agency, introduces a Cloud Federation as an 
integration; made up by combining two or more clouds [59]. The OPTIMIS project introduces 
multi-clouds and cloud-federation separately as if a service provider takes services from 
Infrastructure provider from another cloud; it is federation as the IPs can share resources among 
them horizontally and if service provider accesses two infrastructure providers separately, it is 
called multi-cloud [60]. This project suggests that for efficient decision-making QoS and risk 
management are key factors. QoS can include the process of deciding whether to allocate 
certain resources to a service such that best quality is achieved but resources are not wasted. 
OPTMIS project does not discuss the scheduling for negotiating discovery and allocation of 
resources to other cloud providers via central repository. 
The Reservoir project [61] says relatively smaller and medium providers can’t participate in 
cloud-service provisioning because of non-interoperability so the disparate providers should 
federate for utility provision. If RC denotes reservoir cloud and RS denotes reservoir site then 




providers (IPs). Each reservoir site having resources further divided into Virtual Execution 
Environments (VEE). Service applications can simultaneously utilize virtual execution 
environments’ hosts from various RSs. It focuses on need of SLAs and infrastructure 
monitoring but does not focus on the business requirements for multi-clouds and how to 
establish security and trust. 
The Contrail research project [62] introduces a service level agreement centred federated 
approach for Clouds with an aim to reduce users’ burden by eliminating providers’ lock-in and 
to increase the cloud services’ efficiency both vertical and horizontal integrations. However, 
its documentation does not describe the constraints that could be specified by users in an SLA. 
The BonFIRE project [63] targets finding the possible integrations between network and 
service infrastructures. The BonFIRE project has addressed the extension of current clouds to 
federated clouds with heterogeneous virtualized Resources. They have developed a catalogue 
of standards and procedures to interconnect multi-cloud environment with advanced facilities 
for the purpose of a controlled networking. It also offers low level networking tools for 
monitoring statistics to cloud users. However, for testbeds VMs of different sizes use 100% of 
CPU meaning that the performance of resources might vary a lot between testbeds due to 
heterogeneous hardware. 
The mOSAIC project [64] introduces the service requirement’s specifications in terms of cloud 
ontology through an innovative API. Its implementation offers portability, vendor 
independence, APIs for application development using multi-cloud services. In [65], Buyya et 
al. have proposed a market-oriented cloud architecture and discussed the possibilities of global 
cloud exchanges. An extension of the proposed work in [53], has offered a just-in-time, 
scalable, federation-oriented and an opportunistic multi-clouds services provisioning 




issues to present a market-oriented approach for interCloud offerings. From this security and 
runtime management of cloud resources can be identified as key issues. 
In [66], a business-oriented cloud federation model has been proposed for Real-time Online 
Interactive Application (ROIA). In this model, multiple independent infrastructure providers 
may easily collaborate smoothly for QoS assured ROIA services through scalable IT 
infrastructure.  The scalability and security issues related to cloud services provision have been 
discussed with a business-oriented perspective. The model used an additional business layer 
that could ensure the QoS assured services provision that reduces that scalability of the system. 
In [67], authors discussed the few providers dominated over PaaS market causing adoption 
hurdles for multi-clouds due to lock-in issues; responsible non-portable and non-interoperable 
data applications. To cater them, a novel user-centric broker solution Cloud4SOA for multi 
PaaS; has been proposed to ease multi-cloud collaborations. It focuses on using ontologies to 
give interoperability among cloud providers but does not include the collaboration strategies 
for secure and scalable runtime access to multi-cloud resources. 
2.4 Multi-Clouds Security 
The widespread adoption of cloud computing has increased swiftly in many organizations. The 
high-quality computing services, on-demand shared pools of distributed resources, pay-as-you-
go fashioned reduced costing model have made it a very popular paradigm. These so flexible 
and diverse services along with the layered architecture of cloud computing have great 
attractions for attackers, so security is a major concern in cloud computing. The potential risks 
and threats have increased as cloud computing evolved into multi-clouds computing. As 
various cloud service providers exchange services and resources, so security has become a 




researchers have proposed a variety of techniques and approaches. We will review in detail the 
literature regarding authentication mechanisms, monitoring, service level agreements and 
secure collaborations in the next few sections.  
2.4.1 Multi-clouds Authentication 
Authentication in the perspective of cloud computing; is a fine-grained process of validating 
or verifying the identity of a cloud stakeholder; service user or subscriber. As cloud computing 
evolved to multi-cloud collaborations and services provisioning from multiple clouds providers 
is being utilized so the need of authentication has emerged significantly as it directly impacts 
on the reliability, security and privacy of the cloud services subscriber or users [68-70]. To 
address this significant need for multi-cloud collaboration, various researcher around the globe 
have proposed some state-of-the-art authentication mechanisms for multi-cloud federations 
based on identity management, access control mechanisms, cryptography approaches and 
various other strategies. Here we present the literature overview for authentication mechanisms 
in multi-cloud collaboration security. 
In [71], Hassina Nacer et al. have developed a fully distributed and decentralized authentication 
model for catering dynamic authentication issues, that were complicated and time consuming, 
between various homogeneous and heterogeneous organizations. The proposed model 
basically provides two-way authentication with three-party key generation and a distributed 
certificate authority for the purpose of fulfilling the security requirements for web-services 
delivered over the internet. The author has proposed ontology-based authentication protocol 
annotation to overcome authentication mechanism heterogeneity and a conflict resolution 
algorithm to cater policy heterogeneity. As a proof of concept, a simulation design and a 
prototype web service have been designed. The problem with this work is that it has been done 




circles and they have no underlying bottleneck problem. Moreover, it is only designed to 
address web services collaborations. 
In [72], Noureddine et al. have enhanced the lightweight and user-centric authentication 
protocol OAuth to OAuth 2.0 to solve cloud federation challenges. The OAuth has already 
been used as a simple identity management protocol. The author proposed two modifications 
in this regard. The first modification needs a pre-established trust provision by synchronizing 
an authorization table between the authorization server, resource server and client. The second 
modification induced referral parameters into OAuth so the trust federation among different 
authorization servers can prevail by referring requests. The work can be extended to a single 
authentication server as a cloud-identity provider, but a key challenge is that it requires pre-
established trust provision between multi-cloud entities.  
In [73], Celesti et al. have proposed a three-phase authentication model for cross-cloud 
federation problems after in-depth analysis. Furthermore, a cross cloud federation manager has 
been developed and authentication agent using the SAML CCAA-SSO profile was designed. 
The performance of the work needs to be analysed by the evaluation of authentications, IdP 
enrolments, real testbeds or simulations.  
In [74], Polzonetti et al. have presented a security framework implementing a centralized access 
control for authentication and authorization functions provision to cloud based web services. 
The framework leverages SPID infrastructure to uniquely recognize citizens and enterprises 
through pre-issues identifiers from identity providers. The proposed framework does not 
provide users’ management as it uses SPID. It basically provides authentications through 
federation. The framework being an interface; authenticates remote SPID complaints and 
shows the results to web applications or services hosted on the cloud. It has two OpenAM 




as; policy agent for compatible application and services, a reverse proxy for outdated 
application and services, and OAuth/OpenID connect protocol. This work can be extended by 
inducing an attribute authority service.   
In [75], Demchenko et al. have proposed a federated access control model using Federated 
Identity Management (FIDM) framework. It can also be supported by the trusted third-party 
entities, for example, Cloud Service Broker (CSB). The model further defines the intercloud 
federation framework (ICFF) that is a part of the previously proposed general intercloud 
architecture framework (ICAF). The research discusses components of the distributed 
federated multi-domain authentication and authorization infrastructure and provides various 
federated identity management scenarios and architecture patterns.  
In [76], Celesti et al. have put forward a SAML SSO profile for the establishment of trusted 
interdomain communications under three-tier cloud architectures applied in various CLEVER-
based clouds. Cross-Cloud federation indicates the trust-context establishment between various 
cloud provider platforms in different administrative domains and places. Federation 
encourages clouds’ interdomain communications.  The federation is set up in three phases; 
discovery, match-making and authentication. In this work, the author focused on authentication 
phase for CLEVER intra-domains secure interactions but do not provide measures of the 
scalability of their solution. 
In [77], Celesti et al. have discussed the privacy, security and federation issued in detail in the 
context of the federation of clouds then presented an authentication architecture to cater the 
problems and issued faced in identity management in the context of InterCloud. Furthermore, 
it has been investigated how the proposed architecture can be applied to manage the desired 




In [78], the authors have proposed a novel framework for access control mechanism in the 
perspective of IaaS cloud environment. A hybrid access control model/mechanism of the type-
enforcement access control and the role-based access has been proposed. Furthermore, to 
assign the permissions dynamically for virtual machines, a permission-transition model has 
been designed. An access control mechanism based on VMM arbitrates in a fine-grained 
manner; the virtual machines’ requests to the underlying resources. A VMM-enabled access 
control mechanism has been put forth for relating intra-virtual machines communication 
channels. The author further implemented iHAC in iVIC IaaS cloud platform. This research 
recommends access control to be moved in hypervisor and taken away from network which 
places large overhead on the model. 
In [79], authors have proposed a novel authentication and authorization model for cloud 
services. The proposed model supports all the features that are intended for authorization 
services provisioning. That features can be listed as hierarchical RBAC, federation, path-based 
object hierarchies and multi-tenancies. The author further discussed in detail the 
implementation and architecture of the proposed model and highlighted it in terms of 
scalability.  
2.4.2 Multi-Clouds Secure Collaboration 
The collaboration or federation of multiple clouds refers to integration or combination of 
multiple clouds service providers’ working into a single and integrated unit of clouds. Cloud 
computing paradigm has evolved considerably, and this evolution is of very much interest for 
the potential attackers. With the advent of the internet, the computing grew up swiftly from 
standalone to distributed and from distributed to cluster and grid and then to clouds. In the 
paper [50], the authors have discussed in detail the various evolving and emerging cloud 
computing trends and directions proposed or presented so far. The multi-clouds or inter clouds 




Multi-clouds or inter-clouds federations have been considered as a single and a heterogeneous 
architecture that offers on-demand cloud services from multiple cloud services providers to the 
cloud users or customers on pay as you go fashion with high quality services at reduced costs 
[53].  To manage this all the security and privacy have become a significant concern in this 
regard. Let us have a broad overview of the literature in the context of multi-clouds secure 
collaborations.  
In the paper [80], authors have proposed a novel collaborative framework combining software 
defined networking with service function chaining to maximize the collaboration among 
various SSFs to cater large-scale security threats and attacks. As visualization has opened a 
new era of security and privacy on the network landscape and security attacks and threats are 
being evolved and emerged, their increasing diversity and size urge to make a collaborative 
solution more resilient to combat them. Collaboration among security services functions (SSFs) 
is needed and expected to be essential to ‘security as a service’ layer. Furthermore, the author 
discussed a framework allowing security services functions (SSFs) from various domains to 
dynamically control the resources allocated. This collaboration framework launches a 
distributed large attacks mitigation system in a scalable and dynamic manner. This work incurs 
low overheads among its compared techniques or frameworks. 
Standards such as ISO 27000 and NIST-FISMA can aid the cloud service providers to increase 
security and maintain the customers trust. But the problem with these standards is that they are 
still not fully capable of dealing the full complexities and underlying complications of cloud 
computing platforms rather security frameworks are needed for cloud secure collaborations as 
well. To combat this situation, the authors of [81], have presented a novel cloud computing 
security management framework. The proposed framework has been aimed at FISMA 
standards’ aligning with the cloud computing platform. It can help to enable the cloud 




been based on improvements in collaboration among cloud service providers and cloud service 
customers/consumers in maintaining the state of security of the cloud based hosted services. It 
has been built on security standards assisting in the automation of security management 
process. However, the security categorization of service provider in this paper is qualitative 
and does not take user requirements into account. 
In the paper [82], the authors have presented a novel model checking scheme that can work as 
a management service tool to verify the multi domain cloud policies. Their proposal was based 
on generic model checking by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and 
further interlaced with role based access control (RBAC) reasoning. The existing 
authentication approaches and techniques in grid computing based systems are able enough to 
verify and detect only the redundancies and conflicts among multiple policies. But the issue is; 
the latter could not be capable of overcoming the risk of legitimate user access in multi domain 
cloud computing systems. Furthermore, a formal definition of the proposed technique and its 
security properties have been provided that needs to be verified in multi domain cloud 
computing systems.  
In the paper [83], authors have first reviewed the existing security landscape of cloud 
orchestration and emphasized the current literature’s knowledge gaps. The orchestration is a 
term referred to automated arrangements, services, management of complex systems and 
coordination among multiple computing systems. Authors provide a security threat model by 
listing the security assumptions and elaborating the actual attack surface. The authors of the 
paper have discussed deeply the building blocks of the cloud orchestrators for the deployments 
of multi-cloud federations. In the same way, the authors have proposed and presented a novel 
security architecture in this regard along with various security and privacy enablers for cloud 




architecture has the potential to improve the security of cloud orchestrators but needs to be 
extended to address orchestrations in multi-cloud collaborations.  
2.4.3 Multi-Clouds Monitoring 
A major advantage of cloud computing is that it offers the high level quality of services (QoS) 
as the whole cloud’s story revolves around services. The quality of services is improved 
effectively through monitoring and it is an effective approach for improving various service 
features, for example, software optimization, performance evaluation and auditing, profiling, 
etc. The flexible, diverse and elastic nature of cloud computing needs a strong monitoring 
mechanism, however, monitoring cloud at runtime is a challenging issue.  
To cater this, the authors in [84] have proposed a novel model for monitoring the cloud in its 
runtime. The model was named as RMCM that has provided a representation of running cloud 
by paying attention towards common monitoring concerns. On the base of the proposed model 
RMCM, the authors have implemented a robust and efficient framework for monitoring that 
was able enough to maintain trade-off monitoring capabilities and overheads incurred on 
runtime through the management of motoring related facilities. The proposed model is focused 
on presenting raw monitoring data in a more intuitive form so that user requests can be handled 
more efficiently. Although it improves existing security metrics based on service model 
information, research in this thesis focuses on providing customised methodology to map 
metrics to the cloud system.  
In [85], the authors have proposed, developed and validated a cross layer multi-cloud 
application (CLAMS) as a framework based on services. The proposed services based 
framework was capable of performing various tasks including quality of services monitoring 
of the components of the application (any database, server deployed) and paying visibility the 




world multi-clouds environments, and the results acknowledged that the CLAMS 
outperformed among its counterparts. However, this monitoring approach has not been verified 
for selecting services to suggest their usability along with service selection framework.  
In [86], the author has presented an architecture of monitoring that is configurable 
automatically and activated on the base of a signed service level agreement (SLA). These type 
of monitoring architectures combine various security-related monitoring tools (may be 
developed or hired on ad hoc base). As the data grows and is spread over multiple 
environments, the complexity of risk assessments has become an uncontrollable challenge to 
deal with. In the paper [15], the authors have presented a model for assessing the security risks 
for the distributed business processes in a multi-cloud environment. However, it is only a 
mapping study to understand security risks. 
Policy management has been a significant concern in dealing with the security of 
heterogeneous environments. In the paper [38], the authors have pointed towards the lack of 
security and trust in this new infrastructure model. The authors have designed and presented a 
robust security policy model that has deployed business processes for a cloud based 
infrastructure. The main purpose of this security policy model was to generate an appropriate 
and suitable security policy for a cloud based infrastructure in a dynamic way. As the new 
progress in the domain were carried on, the researchers in  [87] present a security monitoring 
framework that is able to deal with the particularities of cloud computing in an enough adequate 
way. The authors have proposed a detailed and open ISG framework; named ISGcloud that has 
dealt the security monitoring linked at the cloud service lifecycle. However, this work also 
focuses on limited set of security governance while we focus on measuring QoS properties of 




2.4.4 Multi-Clouds SLA Assurance 
The widespread adoption cloud computing has increased swiftly in many organizations. SLA 
– service level agreement, in a general context; as name states, is an agreement between a 
service provider and subscriber that the pre-defined service level of quality, availability, 
reliability and responsibility would be maintained. In cloud computing as the paradigm has 
evolved from SOA, there is SLA needed between service provider and cloud client. As the 
cloud architecture further evolved to multi-cloud collaboration, the SLA assurance became a 
major concern to guarantee the quality of services. So, it is now necessary to mention the right 
usage level of a service and its conditions into a contract; Service Level Agreement (SLA). 
More formally, in an SLA a service-level provider management negotiates, agrees upon and 
finally documents the agreed service-goals with clients of organization and, afterward, 
monitors and produces reports for service providers ability to deliver the agreed level of service 
[88]. Researchers have proposed many secure SLA assurance frameworks and research works 
in the context of multi-clouds federations. Here we present the literature overview of secure 
service level agreement assurance in regard of a multi-cloud collaboration context.  
In [89], authors have developed a secure service level agreement ontology based framework. 
The framework can be used for purposes, for example, to understand the agreement of security 
provision from a cloud provider, to audit that either the compliances from a provider are in 
accordance with federal regulations or not, and to make negotiations for desired security levels. 
The authors extend this work to secure service level agreement in WSAG4J5 based on 
Agreement. WSAG4J5 is the Java implementation based on this work of WS-Agreement. This 
extension would help in designing and implementing service level agreements for particular 
services, validating, monitoring and accounting etc.  
In [90], the authors have introduced a novel approach named SPECS. The SPECS approach 




specify security requirements and to integrate the security services with cloud services to form 
security as a service approach. Moreover, the SPECS helps to negotiate, monitoring and 
enforcing various security parameters pre-specified in the service level agreement (SLA). The 
main benefit of SPECS is that it offers security assurance to clouds’ end users for the cloud 
services provisioning and managing of agreed security parameters mentioned earlier in the 
service level agreement (SLA). The research for this thesis uses the concepts of SPECS for 
SLA assurance such as negotiation, monitoring and enforcement but uses light weight 
mechanisms at each stage for them to be used in a multi-party collaboration scenario across 
multi-clouds.  
In [70], authors have investigated the ways of services selection and allocation in multi-cloud 
delivery model from the perspective of Software as a service provider (SaaS provider). 
Furthermore, authors have proposed a novel framework that assists the providers of SaaS in 
finding the appropriate infrastructure services (IaaS) as per their need or satisfaction levels. 
Moreover, the complete framework, service selection and allocation to detect either there is 
any SLA violation are described. However, for multi-cloud collaboration there is a requirement 
to propose a complete framework that offers service selection and allocation to users and 




2.5 Applications of Multi-Clouds  
2.5.1 Meta-Scheduling using Multi-Clouds 
Meta-Scheduler is a term; referred to a broker or a central scheduler that has a core purpose to 
enforce or establish a wide policy over the distributed resources. It has been frequently 
discussed in various grid computing literature review. The key features of a meta-scheduler are 
negotiation, job scheduling, dispatching and management of resources etc. As various resource 
ownerships led to different topologies, in multi-clouds architectures the meta-scheduler works 
as a broker that assign a job, discard a job, put the job in the queue (if there is already a job in 
provision).  
Meta-Scheduling architecture or topologies are of two types; centralized scheduling and peer-
to-peer /decentralized scheduling. In centralized scheduling, the job-scheduling is carried out 
by a central instance (meta-controller) that is entitled to maintain information of all the 
resources. When a job is submitted from the cloud user to cloud, it is shifted to meta-scheduler. 




The meta-scheduler checks whether there is already another job in progress or not, if there is, 
the meta-scheduler puts the job in a waiting queue or shifts it to other cloud’s local scheduler 
in case of multi-clouds. If there is no job already in progress, then the coming job is shifted to 
job-dispatcher that dispatch the job as per its request to the desired resource.   
In peer-to-peer or decentralized meta-scheduler, each cloud has its own control (a decentralized 
control) that shifts the job to its peers (horizontal peers) and so on. Figure 2.1 shows a high-
level use case diagram of both scheduling (centralized and decentralized) in multi-clouds. In a 
meta-scheduler use case, actors are the cloud users; that submit a job, cancel a job, list jobs and 
make a query about a specific job or service. The resources are the cloud services resources 
that can be related to either service layer (SaaS, PaaS or IaaS) comprising of applications, data 
storage, servers, computing and other miscellaneous services provided by clouds. While the 
requirements can be user-identity, security measures, service-level-agreements (SLAs) and 
federated identity [91-93]. 
The key goals of the scheduling algorithms are to minimise the execution time, costs and 
improve the scalability of the overall system [94]. To minimise the scheduling cost of load 
distribution among clouds a divisible load theory (DLT) based solution was developed in [94]. 
Authors demonstrate their algorithm supports the multi-QoS scheduling but do not test the 
communication overheads which can affect the system performance significantly. Moreover, 
most scheduling algorithms are static in the sense that they assume number of virtual resources 
and cloud facilities (pricing, availability) do not change over time [95]. However, a multi-cloud 
collaboration scenario requires a dynamic scheduling algorithm in which virtual resources and 





2.5.2 E-Healthcare using Multi-Clouds 
Security and privacy have become the significant concerns in such organizational 
collaborations where sensitive data of individuals are dealt, stored and processed. The remote 
geographically dispersed data centres store such data by multi-clouds collaboration where one 
cloud’s services are aggregated with that of another’s to give an integrated and heterogeneous 
single service provision. The security and privacy become of utmost importance when the data 
is health-related. 
There are various acts and legislations in this regard to preserve the privacy of patients’ data, 
for example, HIPAA act. So, for preserving such sensitive data the various research works have 
been proposed so far. With the advent of smart cities, smart phones, smart homes and smart 
everything, the electronic heath (E-Health) have become a new fashion to electronically collect, 
store and retrieve health-related records of a patient for treatment and research purpose. The 
data deal in this regard is termed as ‘Electronic Health Records’ (EHRs) that can be 
electronically collected, stored and retrieved. They may be a form of medical imaging, video 
of ultrasound (for example echocardiography of heart), simple prescriptions or advice, medical 




history or any sort of medical test documents or reports etc. [96-98]. Nowadays, wireless sensor 
networks (WSNs) [99] are being used to collect electronic health records directly from the 
patient even without a doctor. These sensors are the main components to boost up the E-health 
records collection automatically.  
To understand the whole mechanism, we have illustrated a use-case in figure 2.2, in which a 
patient and a doctor are the main actors. The health records are encrypted through that secret 
cryptography scheme and the encrypted form of records are sent to multi-clouds providers so 
that they may store the encrypted data. The access control lists have been maintained on role 
based access control (RBAC). Therefore, the access control list validates the doctor or patient 
role to the computer and the request is forwarded to the encryption-decryption module that 
decrypts the intended electronic health records and provides it to the user computer. E-health 
is no doubt in trends nowadays, but there can be some security, privacy, reliability and 
availability issues either in data-in-transit, sensors and other perspectives. 
2.6 Summary 
Due to increased security issues in multi-cloud domain, threats to cloud services need to be analysed 
to develop a solution providing greater awareness to correlate the services being offered with 
customer requirements. The threat model can act as a trusted advisor to the proposed system 
for mitigating possible attacks by identifying required security features such as compliance and 
monitoring. The state-of-the-art techniques on establishing collaboration between multi-clouds 
are focused on providing cloud broker mechanisms as architectural solutions that can connect 
heterogeneous clouds offering on-demand services from multiple cloud providers. Various 




accessing infrastructure of a separate cloud to share resources, integration of network and 
service infrastructures, and multiple independent infrastructure providers sharing physical 
resources. The existing security standards such as ISO 27000 and FISMA do not cater the 
complexities of multi-party service interactions for the establishment of collaborative paths 
between session partners across multi-clouds. Other proposed mechanisms either do not take 
user collaborative requirements into account [81], have not been formally tested on multi-
clouds [82] or only focus on specific orchestration issues such as authentication or scheduling 
rather than offering an end to end dynamic collaboration. 
The current literature on multi-cloud collaboration also focuses on providing authentication 
mechanisms by which multi-cloud providers can authenticate each other dynamically. The 
dynamic authentication process between multi-clouds could be highly complex and time-
consuming since intermediate authentication paths need to be created at runtime to dynamically 
covert credentials from different security realms. Most techniques offer a one-time 
authentication solution to multi-clouds so that they can authenticate each other and share 
infrastructure resources. In case, where hundreds of users might need to access services based 
in another cloud and each of them must be authenticated separately such solutions are not 
feasible. Existing research either focuses on having pre-established trust provision between 
multi-cloud entities, has scalability problems in dealing with large number of requests, or the 
proposed systems lack the implementation details for testing their scalability on a real cloud. 
Moreover, it has been identified that the multi-cloud authentication establishment may require 
time-consuming activities for credential exchange, verification and session establishment. 
Therefore, a lightweight solution is required that can handle credentials generation, exchange 
and coordinate authentication across multiple heterogeneous clouds independent of their own 




connection to market. Along with the experimental validation, formal analysis of the proposed 
model needs to be done to prove its security in an end to end multi-cloud collaboration scenario. 
 
From the state of the art techniques focused on service level agreement (SLA) management it 
can be understood that the clouds’ success, trust, and reliability depends significantly on the 
ability of clouds service providers of fulfilling the agreed level of services they have promised 
in the service level agreements (SLAs). There is a limited research that offers secure SLA 
assurance frameworks in the context of multi-clouds collaborations. Most of these techniques 
focus on providing solutions to ensure SLA guarantees that service provisioning in cloud is 
according to agreed mechanisms, and not on the enforcement of SLAs during runtime. There 
are a lack of frameworks for SLA management lifecycle in multi-clouds which necessitates the 
requirement to develop light weight mechanisms at each stage of SLA management for them 
to be used in a multi-party collaboration scenario across multi-clouds. Moreover, runtime QoS 
monitoring approaches in clouds focus on limited set of infrastructure monitoring, focus on a 
specific business model, and there is a lack of mechanisms that provide a customised 
methodology to map metrics to the cloud system [84]. Moreover, providing mechanisms that 
can define and generalize the acceptable threshold of SLA violations in terms of functional and 
non-functional QoS requirements of users can highly benefit SLA management in multi-cloud 





Chapter 3 Threat Modelling 
for Services in Cloud  
3.1 Overview 
Due to the dynamic nature of cloud services, many enterprise level security policies, standards 
and practices cannot be implemented in cloud which leads to different security threats. These 
threats can be exploited by various attackers to compromise the cloud services. In this chapter, 
threat modelling for cloud services has been done by considering various attackers such as 
hackers, malicious administrators, malicious users and service providers. After describing 
various threats to services, methodologies to exploit those threats have been presented. 
Moreover, the generalization of threat model has been done to determine the threats related to 
a specific service functionality for various attackers in cloud. 
3.2 Threat Modelling 
The critical assets of cloud such as services and data can be compromised to gain access to 
sensitive data, applications, services and infrastructure. Moreover, compromising the services 
can lead to the misrepresentation of data, manipulating data processing results, failing to 
provide advertised services, and/or performing actions against the user consent as well as 




cloud environment, it is critical to a have a complete understanding of various threats and 
attacks that can compromise various cloud operations. 
An approach called threat modelling can help to identify and address the security issues 
associated with a process. It optimises the security architecture by identifying vulnerabilities, 
analysing the possible threats, and defining countermeasures that can be used to prevent a 
threat. This can also be useful in designing new security mechanisms while taking threats into 
consideration. The key stages in threat modelling are identifying the assets, threats, attackers 
and mechanisms that can be used to exploit the threats [100]. The threat modelling approach 
can be applied to the cloud assets such as services to determine the possible threats and 
mechanisms to exploit those threats. Although threat modelling for web services and cloud 
infrastructure has been presented in literature, only limited research has been done to model 
threats for cloud services and the data they process. 
Each service deployed in the cloud can have multiple instances running in different virtual 
machines in cloud simultaneously and used by different customers. These services process 
large amount of data ranging from public source to private and highly sensitive data. Threat 
modelling for services in this research leads to the identification of various threats, possible 
attackers and the mechanisms to exploit those threats. Some of these threats are specific to the 
misuse of cloud services but other threats come from exploiting various cloud resources such 
as infrastructure, virtual machines, networks, operating systems and applications. Similarly, 
attackers who exploit the threats can vary from outside attacker (hacker) to malicious cloud 
administrator, service provider and cloud users. The mechanisms used by attackers to exploit 
threats have also been explained along with the severity level of threats and their possible 
effects on cloud assets. The generalization of threat modelling for various service 
functionalities has been done that determines the threats for any specific service functionality 




3.3 Service Functionalities 
In this section the generic properties of services are explained. Each service has different 
interfaces that are used for its various functionalities. The general functionality that each 
service must have is data storage, data processing, data transfer in network and authentication.  
3.3.1 Authentication  
This stage involves authenticating the users before giving them access to the service. Most of 
the service providers use application programming interfaces (APIs) to provide services, and 
APIs accept tokens for authentication. Since cloud services can be accessed using different 
devices such as mobile phone and PC, strong authentication should be used. Enterprises should 
use standard such as Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) and Web Services 
Federation (WS)-Federation [101] to authenticate users before giving them access to cloud 
services.  
3.3.2 Data Processing  
In this stage data can be viewed, accessed, updated, and used with or without modification. 
Examples of data processing stage are performing a transaction on the data, or using it in a 
business process.  
3.3.3 Data Storage  
In this stage data is stored in database or storage repository in cloud. The key features of cloud 
storage are durability, availability, performance and security. Data storage also includes 




3.4 Threats to Services in Cloud 
Threat can be defined as any event that is undesirable due to its malicious nature. Data and 
services are vulnerable to different threats in cloud. In this section the threats to data and 
services in cloud are explained. After describing various threats the methodologies presented 
in existing literature to exploit those threats have also been analysed. Moreover, we also list 
the assets affected by specific attacks. 
3.4.1 Data Breach and Data Loss 
 
Data breach is defined as the leakage of sensitive customer or organization data to the 
unauthorized user. It can have a huge impact on the operations of an organization resulting in 
the loss of finance, trust and customers. Similarly, data loss is the second most critical threat in 
cloud computing that can have a very negative affect on the operations of any enterprise.  
3.4.1.1 Methodology 
Data breach threats originate from the flaws in infrastructure, application designing and 
insufficiency of AAA (authentication, authorization, and audit) controls [102]. Y. Zhang et al.  
used cross VM side channel attack to extract cryptographic keys of other VMs on the same 
system and can access their data [103]. While, data loss mostly happens due to data deletion 
and corruption, loss of data encryption key, faults in cloud infrastructure (computing 
resources), or natural disasters. Similarly, data loss can also occur due to malware attacks have 





3.4.2 Evading Provenance 
Provenance is the metadata that describes the history of data. Cloud provider or data owner can 
define different policies in terms of information flow properties, such as read, write, forward, 
excerpt, and paste data, and they may use provenance to keep track of those properties. Evading 
provenance affects data and such threats are mostly exploited by outside attackers.  
3.4.2.1 Methodology 
Data can be manipulated by hackers, insiders or malicious users by evading the provenance or 
violating the policies using the untrusted operating system and applications [104]. Similarly, 
outside hackers can manipulate the shared hardware resources of infrastructure (e.g., CPU 
caches, branch target buffers, network queues, etc.) to access the confidential information from 
running services which require confidentiality [105]. 
3.4.3 Malicious Service Threats 
In a cloud environment, users generally have no mechanisms to trust the services they are 
running and depend on the trust assurances provided by the service provider. The service 
provider or insider can launch a malicious service in cloud, and the users who trust the service 
provider can run that service. This affects both the cloud users and the cloud provider because 
the service may become non-compliant to the service level agreements between user and 
provider. This damages the reputation and credibility of the service provider. The major assets 
affected by such attacks are cloud service and data.  
3.4.3.1 Methodology  
The malicious service can be deployed in cloud that can manipulate the user data, fail to provide 
the advertised services, modify the data processing results, store additional data for harmful 
purposes, and perform other unadvertised activities without the user permission [106, 107]. 




such as service designing, bugs in program code or malware can also compromise the cloud 
services. Attackers can also exploit security misconfigurations in cloud to compromise the 
security of user’s data, services and the whole infrastructure. 
3.4.4 Malicious Administrator Threats  
Cloud administrators are the employees of the cloud provider who have root access to the 
virtual machines and services running inside cloud. They can misuse their privileges to launch 
different attacks inside cloud which lead to the compromise of cloud services and data security.  
3.4.4.1 Methodology 
The cloud administrator can install and execute different software inside the user’s virtual 
machine to perform various attacks. These attacks include hardware, virtualization, operating 
systems, and application attacks. Similarly, the physical access to the hardware provides the 
ability to the administrator for launching more precise attacks that can manipulate user data 
and services. Such attacks include tampering with hardware and cold boot attacks. Cold boot 
attack is usually done by an administrator with physical access to a machine who restarts the 
physical machine to extract encryption keys from the running operating system  [108, 109]. 
Moreover, administrators can also install arbitrary software on the cloud node to access data 
on that node, perform man-in-the-middle attacks on the hosted system, eavesdrop the network 
[110], update virtual machine drivers to vulnerable instances, and copy service data [111].  
3.4.5 Virtualization threats  
Virtualization is the abstraction to provide virtual interfaces similar to the underlying hardware. 
It enables a single system to run multiple instances of isolated virtual machines or containers. 
The basic components involved in virtualization are the virtual machine manager (hypervisor), 
virtual machines (VMs) and virtual disk images. Security mechanisms for physical systems are 




different threats in cloud computing. Moreover, with virtual machine migration data and 
services are transferred to another physical node which can have a different security policy and 
network topology that may result in different security issues. Cloud users can run malicious 
programs in their VMs to gain root privileges and access others users and data [112]. Cloud 
users can run malicious programs in their VMs to gain root privileges and access others users 
and data. 
3.4.5.1 Methodology 
Virtual Machine Escape is a type of attack in which the attacker can run an arbitrary script on 
the guest operating system to get access to the host operating system [113]. This provides the 
attacker root access to the host machine. Running arbitrary code that can also lead to bypassing 
data tracking [114]. Another attack to gain root access to host operating system is done by 
installing malicious hypervisor such as BLUEPILL rootkit on the fly [115]. An attacker with 
privileged access can access the data from physical storage drives, install malicious software 
on the cloud nodes, extract data from secure cloud nodes, copy virtual machines or disks to 
steal user data, bypass data tracking and extract useful information without getting tracked 
[116, 117]. Moreover, an attacker with root privileges can also eavesdrop on the data 
transferred in the network by sniffing, spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks. Due to malicious 
sniffing and spoofing over the network traffic rates can be monitored, and cryptographic keys 
can become vulnerable [118]. 
3.4.6 Network Threats  
The network plays a key role in the communication between cloud resources and between the 
users and the cloud. Without proper network security controls, new attack vectors can arise that 
can have a malicious effect on cloud assets such as data and services. Network threats exist 




misconfiguration of cloud nodes. This can lead to compromise of user data privacy with 
attacker having access to network traffic, hijacking of user account and services, and 
unavailability of resources. Network threats can impact on both the data as well as service 
security and can be launched by outside attacker or malicious users.  
3.4.6.1 Methodology 
Hackers can exploit the platform level vulnerabilities in the cloud to launch network attacks. 
SQL Injection, phishing, fraud, Cross Site Scripting (XSS), botnets, and software 
vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow can result in the hijacking of user account and service 
hijacking [115]. Hijacking user account or services is the stealing of user credentials to access 
his account or computing services. By compromising a service, hackers can execute a denial 
of service (DOS) attack that consumes cloud resources such as computing resources and 
network bandwidth to make them unavailable to legitimate users. Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDOS) attack is a variant of DOS attack in which multiple network sources are used for 
consuming cloud resources [119]. 
3.5 Generalization of Threat Modelling 
The threat model shown in figure 3.1 can be used to determine the threats and attacks on various 
services for a specific attacker in the cloud. The attacks can vary for different services and 
possible attackers in the system. In a case where there is no service running in cloud, then even 
if there are attackers, no threats to services exist. However, if there is a service running in cloud 
with different interfaces for various functionalities than it is vulnerable to different threats. By 
using the threat model presented in the chapter, possible threats and attacks on a service can be 




the methodologies to exploit those threats and the specific service functionalities affected by 
those threats are shown in table 3.1. 
 
Figure 3-1 Threat model for services in cloud computing 
3.5.1 Case Study  
Consider a cloud system based on OpenStack is hosted in a data centre. Suppose a user X leases 
a virtual machine in cloud and runs a Microsoft Word (MW) service in it. User X can access, 
view, read and write data to MW. After using the service, user wants to store it in cloud. In 
order to do the threat analysis for this service we can use our threat model. When the user is 
accessing, viewing, reading or writing the service MW, he is using the data processing 
functionality (F1) of service. Similarly, when a user saves the file on cloud server he uses data 
storage functionality (F2) of service. The possible threats for service MW functionalities (F1 
and F2) can be separately determined for various possible attackers. 
For this case, consider that malicious administrator is the attacker in the system. From the threat 
model in table 1, it can be seen that service is vulnerable to different threats such as evading 
provenance (T1) and malicious service (T2). Threat T1 can affect both the functionalities F1 
and F2 of service MW. The threat exploitation methodology that T1 can use to affect F1 and 




by "manipulating shared physical resources". Whereas, threat T2 can affect functionality F1 of 
service MW. The threat T2 can affect functionality F1 by "launching a malicious service", 
"malicious node giving untruthful data processing results" and "exploiting session 
misconfigurations". 
3.5.2 Generalization  
The basic criteria to determine the threats on services as mentioned in the above example can 
be generalized to figure out the possible threats for service functionalities in the cloud. The 
threats for any service functionality are the cross product of service functionality and possible 
attacker in the system. Therefore, this threat model can be used to determine the possible threats 
for a service functionality in a foreign cloud architecture and can also help in implementing 
security features to mitigate those threats. The summary of the possible threats to services, the 
methodologies to exploit those threats and the specific service functionalities affected by those 
threats are shown in table 1. 
3.6 Summary 
With the increase in cloud usage, the number of services running in cloud and data processed 
by those services has been rapidly increasing. As a result, cloud services have been targeted by 
various attackers. In this chapter, threat modelling approach has been presented to determine 
the threats for cloud services. Along with the important threats to services, this chapter also 
presents the methodologies to exploit those threats. Different possible attackers who can exploit 
specific threats have also been identified. The summary of the possible threats, attackers and 
the mechanisms to exploit those threats has been shown in a table. Threat modelling of services 




approach for determining threats for specific service functionalities can be used to determine a 
system for automated reasoning in which threats for each service interface are listed so that 
possible security mechanisms for those interfaces can be implemented. As a user access 
services in a foreign cloud during multi-cloud collaboration, this model can be used to 











Threat Exploitation Methodology 
Methodology Service Functionality 
Affected 
 




Data deletion and corruption  Data storage 
Insufficient AAA controls  Authentication 
VM side channel attack  Data processing 








Violation of policies by users using 
Untrusted OS and applications  
 
 
Data processing, data storage 








Launching a malicious service  Data processing 
Malicious service node giving 
untruthful dataflow processing   
Data processing 
Exploiting security misconfigurations 
including session, protocol 
configurations and varied security 
policies  







Software execution at customer VM  Authentication, data processing 
Sysadmin can login remotely to any 
machine running outside trusted 
machine  
 
Authentication, data processing, 
data storage 




Rebooting a node and installing 
malicious software to eavesdrop on 
network 

















Arbitrary code execution  
 
Data processing 
Infecting user OS with arbitrary 
malware  
 
Authentication, data processing 
















Network attacks (Phishing, SQL-









Chapter 4 Dynamic 
Collaboration and 
Authentication Model for 
Multi-Clouds 
4.1 Introduction 
In a multi-cloud environment, users access services across multiple cloud providers which 
changes the traditional cloud landscape. However, as discussed in the previous chapters very 
limited research has been done to support services deployment and access across multi-clouds. 
Therefore, advanced development frameworks are required that can offer services orchestration 
across multi-clouds and reduce companies time-to-market to keep cloud services running 
smoothly. A significant challenge associated with the adoption of multi-clouds is the lack of 
solutions and frameworks that can facilitate its usage.  
Despite the widespread adoption of multi clouds and recent advances in this research context, 
the establishment of a secure dynamic collaboration between heterogeneous clouds 
participating in the multi-cloud infrastructure is still an open research problem. Standards such 
as NIST-FISMA and ISO 27000 do not cater the complexities of underlying cloud platforms. 
The framework aimed at aligning with FISMA standards is qualitative and does not take user 
requirements into account. Moreover, the frameworks based on NIST do not provide formal 




automated orchestration such as [83] do not offer end to end solution for multi-clouds and the 
performance and security evolution of proposed solutions is not discussed to prove their 
effectiveness.  
The basic authentication solutions that exist for traditional networks fail to meet the need for a 
dynamic collaboration of clouds and services in multi-cloud. Some authentication solutions 
assume pre-established trust provision that does not satisfy our runtime multi-cloud 
collaboration requirements. Single Sign On (SSO) based authentication profiles for SAML 
have been proposed for cloud collaborations but they induce comparatively higher overheads. 
Moreover, other centralized authentication solutions discussed in chapter 2 are not suitable for 
multi-clouds as they bring performance and security issues and the scalability of these solutions 
to handle large number of requests is not discussed. Therefore, this chapter provides a novel 
de-centralised model for the dynamic and secure collaboration between multi-clouds.  
The proposed model called Multi-Cloud Collaboration (MCC) model provides a novel 
technique for the dynamic authentication which offers single sign on to users trying to connect 
to the foreign cloud. The authentication solution proposed in MCC achieves better performance 
compared to traditional security protocols such as SAML and Kerberos while maintaining 
security. In the next stage, an extension of service level agreements (SLAs) establishment is 
proposed which helps to ensure security while user data and request is being handled in the 
foreign cloud. The usage of SLAs in the proposed model ensures that best services and provider 
are selected to handle the user requests and secure collaboration between multi-clouds is setup.  
The proposed model is based on the NIST cloud computing security architecture standard [120]. 
It satisfies the following conditions: i) Rapid provisioning by automated service deployment; ii) 
Mapping authenticated and authorised data and tasks onto VMs; iii) Monitoring the cloud 




security policies are always enforced; v) Maintaining the service level agreement (SLA) 
established between customers and service providers. 
The functionalities of components responsible for multi-cloud collaboration in MCC are 
presented in detail. Moreover, the proposed collaboration protocols in our research are verified 
using the BAN Logic [121]. The experiments to consider the scalability and overhead of 
proposed techniques are performed on different cloud setups based on OpenStack [122]. These 
experiments indicate the proposed approach supports collaboration among a large number of 
services across multi-clouds and incurs a minor overhead. The major contributions presented in 
this chapter include the following: 
1). A novel model MCC is presented for establishing multi-cloud collaboration. The protocols 
to support the model and the functionalities of its components responsible for multi-cloud 
collaboration are presented in detail. Moreover, it is discussed how the proposed model meets 
the multi-cloud requirements. 
2). Dynamic and lightweight authentication protocols between multi-clouds have been 
presented. We propose a single sign on (SSO) authentication mechanism by which any cloud 
user in the local cloud can authenticate itself with the foreign cloud, and access required 
resources. Moreover, the proposed model uses service level agreement (SLA) mechanism to 
guarantee that best service provider is selected with respect to client requirements, and the 
service execution in the foreign cloud is according to the agreed SLA parameters.  
3). The proposed authentication and collaboration protocols have been formally verified using 
BAN Logic [121], which is a logic used to reason about beliefs, encryption, and protocols.   
4). Experiments have been carried out that show system is scalable and incurs only a minor 




traditional the authentication protocols like SAML [123] and Kerberos [124]. Moreover, the 
system can monitor any SLA violations by the cloud provider and detect them quickly. 
4.2 Multi-Cloud Collaboration Requirements 
Researchers have identified the usage of cloud according to three major categories. First is the 
monolithic environment that involves designing and developing platform independent 
applications. Second is the “Horizontal Expansion” which involves federated clouds which as 
described earlier involve setting up federation between multi-clouds, while third is the usage 
of multi-clouds as “Vertical Supply Chain” that includes cloud providers leveraging services 
from other clouds. This chapter describes establishing collaboration between heterogeneous 
cloud environments in “Vertical Supply Chain” configuration. 
Multi-clouds provide a way for dynamic collaboration between various clouds as there is no 
former agreement between participating clouds and collaboration is established at runtime 
according to requirements. Moreover, in multi-clouds user has the knowledge of all connected 
clouds and is directly responsible to the provisioning of services from multiple clouds which 
can be more beneficial from customers and organizations perspective. Therefore, this work 
focuses on multi-clouds so that users and organizations can dynamically access services across 
various multiple cloud providers. As private clouds offer services to their clients using locally 
hosted infrastructure, using the proposed model can enable them to enlarge their own offers by 




4.2.1 Collaboration Objective 
The objective of multi-cloud collaboration is that the proposed model MCC should be able to 
handle maximum number of user requests from local cloud and successfully grant them access 
to required services in the foreign cloud.  
To achieve this objective, we define an objective function for multi-cloud collaboration in 
which M cloud users (j = 1, 2 … M) in local cloud have requested access to S services (i = 1, 
2 … N) in a foreign cloud. This can be formally defined as: 
O (i, j) = Min  ∑  𝑵𝒊=𝟏 ∑ (𝑹𝒊𝒋 − 𝑪𝒊𝒋)
𝑴
𝒋=𝟏  
In the above equation, N is the numbers of services requested and M is the number of users 
making requests respectively. Rij is the required number of user’s requests for services to be 
granted while Cij is the number of services that were actually granted by MCC. We want the 
objective function to be as low as possible, and in an ideal case it should be zero to show all 
user requests have been handled and they have been allocated services in foreign clouds.    
4.3 Multi-Cloud Collaboration (MCC) Model 
Based on heterogeneous requirements of multi-clouds, we propose a novel model MCC that 
can enable dynamic collaboration between users and services in multi-clouds. It acts as a 
possible marketplace between two clouds to set up communication, perform authentication, 
match SLAs, and handle security. Therefore, MCC has a greater awareness to correlate the 
services being offered with customer requirements and acts as a trusted advisor to the proposed 
system so that security features such as compliance and availability are considered. MCC also 
acts as a possible marketplace between two clouds to set up communication, match SLAs as 




The proposed model Multi-Cloud Collaboration (MCC) provides extended functionalities to 
organizations in which they can apply their business models. MCC has been designed with the 
goal to enhance secure multi-cloud collaboration in which cloud providers can easily apply 
their business model. It is based on an architectural solution that can be setup multi-cloud 
collaboration between any clouds irrespective of their underlying implementation. The 
architecture of the proposed model involves various components that have been implemented 
in each participating cloud to achieve the secure multi-cloud authentication and collaboration. 
These components involved in model design are authenticator for managing identity and 
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The figure 4.1 displays various components in a MCC that are used to communicate and 
collaborate among multi-clouds. All the system components serve different functions which 
are described below. In this chapter, the communicating clouds are referred to as “local cloud” 
in which the user is located and “foreign cloud” to which user needs access and collaboration 
has to be established.  
4.3.1 MCC Orchestration and Components 
In this section, the details of MCC’s components and their functionalities are discussed. The 
protocols to support the model are also presented in this section. The details of how all 
components interact and MCC components integration with each other and workflow are 
explained in section 4.3.2. 
4.3.1.1 MCC Initialization Protocol 
The initialization protocol is the first step in MCC orchestration that is used to set up the system 
services, parameters and attributes required for multi-cloud collaboration. This protocol 
discusses how certificates are set up and MCC is initialised after receiving client request.  
When the required services are booted in the model, and user request for multi-cloud access is 
received, authentication service in the Authenticator component establishes if it has the 
certificate for that user that can be used for authentication with foreign clouds. If the certificate 
does not exist in the cloud, Authenticator which is a RESTful web service submits a request on 
behalf of its cloud to Trusted Party (TP) for certificate generation.  Trusted party is responsible 
to generate a certificate for cloud after receiving a request and cloud parameters and to use a 
function to map a certificate to client ID which is returned to the requesting cloud. The 
Authentication Service of cloud receives the certificate and stores it to be used for 






















4.3.1.2 MCC Authentication Protocol 
The existing authentication solutions for multi-clouds have various limitation such as inability 
of standards (NIST, FISMA) to satisfy multi-clouds requirements, performance issues with 
SAML and scalability issues with centralised solutions. To address these issues, we propose an 
authentication protocol that describes how multi-cloud authentication is set up between 
participating clouds using MCC.  
In a distributed multi-cloud environment, a large number of clouds are present with each cloud 
having tens of users, which makes credential management a big challenge. Moreover, in a 
dynamic collaboration setup between multi-clouds, each cloud might have different 
authentication mechanisms. This raises a need to develop a lightweight sign on (SSO) 
authentication mechanism by which any cloud user in the local cloud can authenticate itself 
1. BEGIN: Boot the required services to enable multi-cloud collaboration 
2. while (the system is running) 
3. LC (Auth_service) -> Check (Cert) 
4. if Valid (Cert): 
5.  goto 17 
6. else: 
7.  Auth_service -> Send_request (Cert, ID) -> TP 
8. end if  
9.  for i = 1 to n: 
10.  LC -> Mapping_data(LC) -> TPi 
11.  TPi -> Publish(Cert) 
12.  TPi -> Send_generated_certificate (Cert) -> LC  
13.  LC (Auth_service) -> Receive (Cert)  
14.  end for  
15. LC (Auth_service) -> Check (Cert) 
16. if Valid (Cert): 
17.  wait (Request) 
18. else: 
19.  goto 7 







with the foreign cloud, and access required resources. In MCC, for authentication orchestration 
we use a Trusted Party (TP) which acts as an identity provider on which a requesting user must 
hold a digital identity, based on which TP grants a digital certificate to that user that it can use 
to authenticate with the foreign cloud. Since the foreign cloud also trusts TP, the user is able to 
authenticate itself and access resources based on that certificate. 
We assume that the local cloud’s request is composed of two parts namely the certificate and 
the required cloud service. Initially, a certificate is sent by the local cloud (LC) to the foreign 
cloud (FC) for proving its identity. This certificate contains a set of attributes including the 
cloud identifier, digital signature, and validity period of the certificate. This message is 
encrypted by the public key of FC. 
Foreign cloud initially checks the validity of the certificate sent by the local cloud. If the 
certificate is valid, FC then sends a response message to LC that it is authenticated. However, 
if the certificate is invalid, FC sends the message of failed authentication to LC and waits for a 
new certificate. This message is encrypted with the public key of LC. In case the message 
received from FC is that the authentication certificate was invalid, LC sends a message with its 
credentials to the Trusted Party (TP) to generate a new certificate. TP generates a new 
certificate and sends it to the LC which is sent from LC to FC. 
FC checks the new certificate received from LC. If the certificate is invalid again, the 
authentication request is terminated. If authentication of LC is successful, both FC and LC 
exchange nonce messages to agree on a session key using Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm 
[124]. Since DH key exchange is performed after certificate exchange, it is called authenticated 
DH which is more secure compared to usual DH. 
After cloud authentication, LC sends a message to FC containing client authorization details 




be accessed and required resources message, it locally computes if the tasks from LC have the 
authorization to access the required services. The corresponding FC computes the status of the 
IoT services associated with the request. The status is computed due to the fact that users on a 
local cloud can have the different status of privileges that can affect their level of access to 
resources. For example, only privileged users might have access to some expensive services 





























2. Data: request: Communication request received by cloud controller  
3. LC -> Send_request (authentication) -> FC (secured using SSL) 
4. for j = 1 to n do: 
5.  FC -> Verify (Cert, ID) 
6. if Verify (Cert, ID): 
7.  goto 17 
8. else: 
9.  FC -> Send_request (New_Cert) -> LC 
10. end if 
11.  LC -> Send_request ((Cert),Profile) -> TP  
12. TP -> Send (Cert) ->CC [generates updated certificate for LC and sends to 
LC] 
13. LC -> Send_msg (Cert) -> FC  
14. if Not_valid (Cert): 
15.  End 
16. else: 
17.  FC -> Send_msg(n) -> LC  
18. end if 
19. FC -> Wait (response) -> LC 
20. if no_resp(): 
21.  End 
22. else: 
23.  LC -> Send_msg(n+1) -> FC encrypted using LC- FC session key 
generated by DH  
24.  FC -> Send_msg(request_authorization) -> LC encrypted using LC-
FC session key 
25.  LC-> Send_msg(Send_LCAuthorization_level) -> FC encrypted using 
LC-FC session key 
26.  FC -> compute_local_level (LC) 
27.  if compute_local_level = True: 
28.   FC->Authentication_local (LC,FC,+) 
29.  else: 
   FC ->Authentication_local (LC,FC,-) 
30.   end if 
31. end if 






4.3.1.3 SLA Negotiation 
A key feature of MCC orchestration is the SLA co-ordinator components in MCC that receives 
user requirements and SLA’s from the foreign cloud and negotiates a dynamic SLA between 
them. SLAs are key part of MCC to guarantee that users quality of service (QoS) requirements 
are satisfied. Various mechanisms exist to ensure service provisioning in multi-clouds with 
minimum SLA violations. The SLA co-ordinator in MCC is implemented as a middleware 
layer with the proposed system to facilitate communication between multi-clouds through 
adaptability and rapid response. SLA assurance is offered through negotiation, monitoring and 
enforcement stages by using lightweight mechanisms that are efficient and secure for multi-
party collaborations across multi-clouds.  SLA Negotiation involves agreeing on the service 
terms for SLA and QoS parameters, measuring metrics (service level objectives) and defining 
how the metrics will be measured. While service providers also check if they can provide 
requested service and perform basic risk evaluation in case. Moreover, the proposed threat 
model in chapter 3 can be used to highlight and determine possible threats, and service 
functionalities that attackers are most likely to target for taking precautionary measures to 
prevent such events. 
The proposed model uses WS-Agreement [125] to express the functional security requirements 
and non-functional requirements requested by the client. The XML data structures are 
generated on the basis of WS-Agreement document, the service interface definition and its 
implementation. Therefore, QoS tags are associated with a new category to recognize security 
and other properties. To implement the negotiation, WS- Agreement Negotiation has been 
used. The protocols are implemented in the form of a REST based service and API.  
4.3.1.4 SLA Enforcement 
Once a user is authorized to access cloud resources, the next stage is the enforcement of security 




SLA assurances. The proposed model focuses on the implementation of mechanisms for non-
functional properties to ensure that service complies with the defined SLA policies. QoS 
parameters mentioned in SLAs are measured by maintaining current system configuration 
information and runtime information of parameters that are part of SLOs. 
4.3.1.5 SLA Monitoring 
Currently, no solutions exist to check for SLA compliance for user’s support. Monitoring 
involves, i). verifying that SLAs are followed through infrastructure access, and ii). generating 
alert notification if the SLAs are violated to take corrective steps. In order to implement these 
functionalities, continuous monitoring techniques can be applied that employ IaaS monitoring 
techniques. The proposed model uses event driven modules to collect all generated events and 
performs required filtration operations before analysing them. Based on the captured events 
and their analysis, monitor informs the local cloud if the foreign cloud is compliant with the 
signed SLA or not.  In case of SLA violations, user can enforce penalties on the provider. 
4.3.2 MCC Components Integration  
This section explains the workflow for the overall model and the implementation details of 
various components as shown in figure 4.2. A user request to connect to the foreign cloud is 
received by cloud controller that advertises request to connect to multiple foreign clouds and 
receives their responses. The client details, cloud responses and received SLAs are handled by 
































Figure 4-2 Workflow of the proposed model 
 
4.3.2.1 Cloud Controller 
This is the major component responsible to handle the multi-cloud communication and 
authentication. This component provides accelerated connection to market by combining 
customer requirements, checking available services and connecting with the foreign cloud. The 
controller is implemented as RESTful web service in cloud and its responsibilities are two folds. 
First in the local cloud when it wants to access a foreign cloud and second in a foreign cloud 
when a connection request is received.  
When a user in local cloud needs to access service in a foreign cloud, it is the responsibility of 
a controller to establish a connection with the other foreign cloud. Before sending a message to 
the foreign cloud, it communicates with the local authenticator component to get the certificate. 
After sending authentication request, on behalf of local cloud it establishes the communication 
channel by sharing session keys.   
In a foreign cloud, requests for communication from the local cloud are received by cloud 
controller. Cloud controller is then responsible to check whether, (a) the requested service is 
available in the foreign cloud, (b) the connecting local cloud is trustworthy, and (c) respond to 




4.3.2.2 Cloud Controller Client 
This component is responsible to manage the local services and resources in a cloud. Once a 
cloud controller receives the communication request in a foreign cloud, it sends a message to 
controller client to check the availability of requested service. The controller client matches the 
request with available resources and returns the response about resources status to the controller. 
Similarly, when the local cloud wants to communicate with a foreign cloud, the controller client 
is responsible to check the details of a client who needs to access foreign cloud and pass them 
to the controller. 
4.3.2.3 Authenticator 
Authenticator component is responsible to manage the authentication of multi-clouds. Once the 
communication request from the local cloud reaches the foreign cloud, cloud Controller of 
foreign cloud connects with the authenticator to verify if the connecting (local) cloud is trusted 
or not. When the authenticator component receives the message containing the identity of local 
cloud and its digital certificate, it checks whether the certificate is valid and responds to 
controller component. Based on the response from the authenticator, cloud controller of foreign 
cloud responds to the cloud controller of the local cloud. 
In a local cloud, when a collaboration request is to be sent to foreign cloud authenticator is 
responsible to contact trusted party (TP) which generates the certificate for the local cloud, signs 
it and returns it to the local cloud. Before sending a communication request to a foreign cloud, 
local cloud controller gets its certificate from the authenticator.  
4.3.2.4 Trusted Party 
Trusted party (TP) is the identity provider responsible to handle the authentication among multi-
clouds. It has a list of trusted cloud providers, and before establishing session the connecting 




generates a certificate, signs it with its private key and returns it to the requesting cloud. Any 
cloud registered with a TP receiving a certificate signed with a private key of that particular TP 
considers it true. 
It is the responsibility of the Authenticator component to ensure that the certificate obtained 
from TP is valid and to get a new certificate if the existing one is revoked or rejected by foreign 
cloud. 
4.3.2.5 SLA Co-Ordinator 
The usage of security mechanisms using SLA ensures that best services and provider are 
selected and secure collaboration between multi-clouds is setup. The foreign cloud provider 
handling user requests will be responsible to enforce mechanisms that protect the security 
properties given in multi-clouds. The next phase in SLA involves monitoring the service 
security properties in the foreign cloud and report the SLA compliance to the local cloud. 
The key requirements from SLAs have been defined are:  
• Receive request from the controller and associated SLAs to negotiate the best 
possible provider 
• Review service availabilities from various providers  
• Generate dynamic SLA’s for the user and foreign cloud agreement 
• Monitor service execution at the foreign clouds  
• Prevent SLA violations by taking responsive action in case of SLA’s violations 
by informing cloud provider  
 
SLA-Coordinator is responsible to manage SLA’s in the proposed model. It initially selects the 
suitable service for a client in local cloud based on his requirements using negotiation. Once a 




enforcement component is responsible to ensure that service execution in a foreign cloud is 
according to the QoS parameters agreed in the SLA. Moreover, the monitor is responsible to 
ensure that the service used by cloud provider complies with the SLA and in case there is a 
violation of SLA it reports that violation to the service provider. 
4.4 Formal Verification of MCC Protocols 
To establish collaboration across multi-clouds, we propose different further protocols in this 
section. These protocols represent the set of messages which will be transported across different 
entities to support authentication and collaboration. Cloud A in these protocols represents the 
local cloud and Cloud B represents the foreign cloud. Both these clouds have certain 
components that support the exchange of messages between them. The detailed design of these 
components responsible for multi-cloud communication is shown in section 2. 
 These protocols are verified using the formal logic called BAN (Burrows–Abadi–Needham). 
BAN logic is used to reason about beliefs, encryption, and protocols. BAN logic consists of 
three stages to analyse any protocol which are, (i) to express the initial assumptions, and goals 
as statement to translate them to symbolic notations, (ii) to verify the goal whether the goals are 
in fact reached, and (iii) to perform a group of rules for acquiring the authentication goal. 
4.4.1 Definitions 
The authentication protocols proposed in this chapter can be verified using the logic of 
authentication called BAN logic. Followings notations are used for formal definitions in 
protocols: 
     A, B, C     Three separate multi-clouds identified as A, B and C 




    S      Session key 
    SA      Session authority 
    Pri(X)     Private key of X 
    Pub(X)     Public key of X 
    SA (A,S)         Statement that A and S are session partners 
    K(A,B)               Secret key generated by Pri(A) and Pub(B)  
    B | ≡ 𝑋            B believes statement X is true 
    A
𝐾(𝐴,𝐵)
−
↔   𝐵     A still does not identify if B knows K(A,B) 
    A
𝐾(𝐴,𝐵)
+
↔   𝐵          B has sent confirmation A that it knows K(A,B) 





4.4.2 BAN Rules 
Rule 1. A|≡ (X, Y) ⟹ A|≡ X and  A|≡ 𝑌, 
A believes a set of statements if and only if A believes every individual statement, respectively. 
Rule 2. A|≡ #M ⟹ A|≡ #(𝑀,𝑁) and A|≡ #(𝑁,𝑀) 
If a part of the message is believed to be fresh than the whole message is considered fresh. 
Rule 3. A|≡  B| ⟹ X,  A|≡ 𝐵 |≡ 𝑋 ⟹  A|≡ 𝑋 
If A believes that B has a control over statement X, and if A believes that B believes X, then A 
should believe X. 
Rule 4. A|≡↑Pub (A), A|≡↑Pub(B) ⟹ 𝐴
𝐾(𝐴,𝐵)
−
↔   𝐵 
If A has B’s public key and believes that the public keys of A and B are both good, A can 
believe that the secret is shared with no party other than B although unconfirmed. 
Rule 5. A|≡ 𝐴
𝐾(𝐴,𝐵)
−
↔   𝐵, A sees [𝑋]𝐾(𝐴,𝐵),   
A|≡ #X,  ⟹  A|≡ 𝐴
𝐾(𝐴,𝐵)
+
↔   𝐵 
If A believes the secret 𝐾(𝐴,𝐵)
−  is shared with no party other than B (but A does not know B 






Rule 6.  A|≡ 𝐴
𝐾(𝐴,𝐵)
+
↔   𝐵, A sees X, A|≡ #X,  ⟹  A|≡ 𝐵| ≡X 
If A believes that the secret is shared with no party other than B and is confirmed, and X is 
fresh, then A can believe that B believes X. 
Rule 7. A|≡ 𝐵
𝐾
↔A , A sees [𝑋]𝐾 ⟹   A sees X,  
If A knows the secret shared with B and see X encrypted by the secret, then A can see X. 
4.4.3 Session Establishment Protocol 
This protocol serves the purpose for a user (user A) of local cloud (cloud A) that wants to access 
services running in the foreign cloud (cloud B). Firstly, user A sends a message to its cloud 
controller service that it wants to access a service in cloud B. The controller service of cloud A 
sends a request to cloud B where it is received by the controller to establish a connection. 
Controller service of cloud B verifies the integrity of the message received from cloud A and 
authenticates user A using its unique ID and certificate. If the certificate is valid, cloud B 
responds to cloud A with authentication success message, which is followed by both clouds 
determining a shared secret key using Diffie Hellman key exchange algorithm. Using, this key 
session between multi clouds is established in which users from cloud A can communicate 














Details of messages in the figure 4.3: 
(1a) Local cloud (cloud A) user request to access service in foreign cloud (cloud B) 
(1b) Controller of local cloud (cloud A) sends a request to controller service in cloud B to 
access resources 
(2a) Cloud B verifies credentials of cloud A user making request to access resources 
(2b) Verify credentials of cloud A user and send response to controller 
(3) Forward authentication response to controller of cloud A. There are two possibilities 
in this case.  
a. In case of successful authentication: Controllers of cloud A and B agree a 
session key using Diffie Hellman Key Exchange process and establish 
communication 
b. In case of unsuccessful authentication: Cloud A controller is notified and it 




























       (4) User is authenticated to access resources in foreign cloud 
4.4.3.1 Verification 
 
1. A→B: [Request, IDA, CertA, N] 
2. B→A: [Verify, IDB, IDA, N0]  
3. A→B: [Confirm, SP(A,S), IDSA, IDB, IDA, N1]K(A,B) 
4. B→A: [Reply, IDA, IDB, N2]K(B,A) 
The messages 1 and 2 are protected by SSL while 3,4 are encrypted using secret keys using 
Diffie Hellman key exchange algorithm. 
The goals of the protocols can be described as follows: 
(1) Verifying identity of A who wants to establish a session, and accept it as a session 
partner which can be described as: B|≡
𝑃𝑢𝑏(𝐴)
→    A 
(2) Building confirmed secret key to be shared between A and B which can be described 
as: A |≡ B | ≡ K(B,A) 
The assumptions of the protocol can be described as follows:  
A|≡↑ Pub(B), B| ≡↑ Pub(A)  which means that A and B believe the keys of others are secure 
B|≡↑ Pub(B),   A| ≡↑ Pub(A) which means that A and B believe their private keys are secure 






Theorem 1: The goals of the protocol for cloud authentication are satisfied under the 
assumption of this protocol. 
Proof: It is needed to deduce that: B≡
𝑃𝑢𝑏(𝐴)
→    A and  
A |≡ B | ≡ K(B,A)from the assumptions of the protocol. 
From the following assumptions: B| ≡↑ Pub(B) and B| ≡↑ Pub(A) ……… (a) 
First goal is achieved in the following way:  
• From equation (a) and message 1 it can be derived from that, B |≡ [Request, IDA, CertA] 
• Similarly from the assumptions: B |≡ #𝑁1 
• It follows that, B |≡ #[Request, IDA, CertA] by  
Rule 2  
• B |≡ # [CertA] by Rule 2 
The second goal is achieved in this way: 
• Equation (a) follows that B |≡ B
𝐾(𝐵,𝐴)
−
↔   A by  
Rule 4 …..(i) 
• Similarly, from the assumptions: B |≡ #𝑁1  
• It follows that B |≡ #[IDA,  IDB , SP(A, S), N1] by Rule 2 …….(ii) 
• By using the equations (i), (ii) it can be deduced that  
B |≡ B
𝐾(𝐵,   𝐴)
+
↔    A by Rule 5 ······(iii) 
• Using Rule 6 and eq. (iii) it can be deduced that: 





4.4.4 Session leaving Protocol 
This protocol is defined for the case when a user in local cloud (cloud A) wants to leave the 
session with foreign cloud (cloud B) and end its communication with the foreign cloud. Firstly, 
the user A from cloud A (which is using cloud B services) will send a request to its controller 
service that it wants to leave the session. When controller service of cloud B receives request 
from cloud A to close the session, it verifies the integrity of cloud A who sent the message and 










Details of messages in this process shown in figure 4.4 are as follows: 
(1) Local cloud (cloud A) user request to close session with resources in foreign cloud 
(cloud B) 
(2) Controller of local cloud (cloud A) sends a request to controller service in cloud B to 
close existing session of that user 
(3) Accept request to close a particular user’s session in Cloud B 
(4) Foreign cloud (cloud B) closes existing session, removes the allocated resources and 



























1. B->A: [IDB, N]K(B,A) 
2. A->B: [Request, Exit(A,S), IDA, IDB, N1]K(A,B) 
3. B->A: [IDB, IDA, Rm(S), N2]K(B,A) 
The goals of the above protocol can be described as: 
(1) Request to remove A from session S which can be labelled as: B| ≡ Exit(A, S) 
(2) Destroying session key and notifying A that session has been removed. This can be 
described as: A | ≡ B | ≡ Rm(S) 
The assumptions of the protocol can be described as follows:  
A|≡↑ Pub(B), B| ≡↑ Pub(A)  which means that A and B believe the keys of others are secure 
B|≡↑ Pub(B),   A| ≡↑ Pub(A) which means that A and B believe their private keys are secure 
A|≡ #𝑁1, 𝐵| ≡ #𝑁1, 𝐴| ≡ #𝑁2 which means that entities believe the Nonce N1 and N2 are 
fresh. 
A | ≡ B| ≡ Exit(A, S) which means that A and B believe they can control leaving the session  
The first goal is achieved in the following way: 
• From message 1 and Rule 7, B |≡ B
𝐾(𝐴,   𝐵)
+
↔    A   ---(i) 
• By Rule 2, A |≡  #[Request, Exit(A,S), IDA, IDB, N1]K(A,B)  …… (ii) 
• From (i) and (ii), A | ≡ B| ≡  [Request, Exit(A,S), IDA, IDB, N1]K(A,B)        ….. (iii) 
• From Rule 1 and (iii), it can derived that:  
A | ≡ B| ≡  Exit(A,S) …… (iv) 




B| ≡  Exit(A,S) 
 
The second goal is achieved in the following way: 
• From the following assumptions: A| ≡↑ Pub(B) and A| ≡↑ Pub(A) ……… (b) 
• A |≡ A
𝐾(𝐴,𝐵)
−
↔   B by Rule 4 …..(iv) 
• From eq (iv) and Rule 7, A |≡ [IDB, IDA, Rm(S), N2]  …………. (v) 
By the assumption 𝐴| ≡ #𝑁2 and eq (v), 
• By Rule 2, A |≡ # [IDB, IDA, Rm(S), N2] …………. (vi) 
• From equations (iv), (v), (vi) and Rule 6 it can be derived that, 
A | ≡ B| ≡  [IDB, IDA, Rm(S), N2] …….. (vii) 
• By Rule 1, eq (vii) leads to A | ≡ B| ≡  Rm(S) 
 
4.5 Business Case  
MCC can enable participants in the ecosystem to takes various roles depending on the situation. 
For example, a user can turn into a provider whenever it has spare resources by offering them 
on the market. MCC can be used to enable users of a cloud platform to access services in 
another cloud. There are many other business cases of this model that can help to improve the 
business supply chain. Consider a case in which an organization named E-Packagers is using 
cloud resources and services on a cloud service provider. The company has set up a cloud and 
they require its resources during peak times between 9 am to 5 pm on working days and usage 




cloud resources and services will be idle and their usage will be really low. However, using 
MCC the company can further lease its services to be used by users from other clouds who can 
directly contact E-Packagers and use their services for a certain time without their cloud 
provider interaction. This can help the company to generate additional revenues and users to 
access services with lesser conditions in less time. 
4.6 Experimentation 
To examine the feasibility of the proposed design empirically, it was implemented in two 
different clouds. The purpose of these experiments is to assess the, (i) scalability of the proposed 
system and (ii) runtime overheads of the system during collaboration between multi-clouds. The 
performance of authentication protocols is compared with the standard authentication protocols. 
Furthermore, we discuss developing MCC cloud controller as a modular service by splitting its 
functionality into message queues and networking service that can avoid performance 
bottlenecks and enable MCC to handle large number of requests coming from clients during 
collaboration. 
The prototype was tested on two different cloud infrastructures. One of the cloud infrastructures 
was an OpenStack cloud based in University of Derby. This setup consists of six server 
machines. Each machine has 12 cores with two 6-core Intel Xeon processors running at 2.4 GHz 
with 32 GB RAM and 2 TB storage capacity. The cloud nodes on which the experiments were 
performed had 4 VCPUs running at 2.4 GHz each, 8 GB RAM, and data storage of 100 GB per 
node. The second cloud was also based on OpenStack and it was set up on machine with Intel 
Core(TM) i7-4790 processors running at 3.6 GHz with 16 GB RAM and 1 TB storage capacity. 














OpenStack Cloud A OpenStack Cloud B
 
Figure 4-5 Experimental Setup 
Both the Cloud Controller and Cloud Authenticator are employed as web services which help 
in avoiding tightly bound security. While WS-Agreement was used to implement the SLA 
components. To enable the interaction among components in prototype according to the 
proposed system, cloud controller of local cloud submits requests for resources to other foreign 
clouds. When the foreign cloud controller initializes and receives a request for available services 
from a local cloud, it shares exchange information about available services and their 
characteristics.  
In the experiments, to check the scalability of the system initially a large number of service 
requests were created in local cloud so that they can be connected to multiple instances in foreign 
cloud. To start the communication, cloud controller from a local cloud invokes the cloud 
controller in foreign cloud. This is then followed by various operations in foreign cloud 
including checking the availability of the required services, verifying if the local cloud user that 
wants to connect is authorized and SLA negotiation to agree the functional and non-functional 
requirements of services that need to be satisfied. After performing authentication and 
communication among multiple instances, a large number of users from local cloud were able 
to request for multi-cloud collaboration and access service instances in the foreign cloud, and 




To evaluate the overhead caused by protocol, the time taken by different operations was 
calculated. The time taken by different instances during authentication with instances in the 
foreign cloud using the proposed system is shown respectively in figure 4.6.   
 
Figure 4-6 Authentication time for various instances 
 
To assess the effectiveness of our proposed prototype, we compared the results with other 
commonly used authentication protocols like SAML and Kerberos. Figure 4.7 shows that 
proposed authentication protocol is very efficient and scalable compared to other protocols. The 
proposed authentication protocol has better performance than traditional protocols like SAML 
and Kerberos as it is designed specifically for heterogeneous multi-cloud scenarios. Kerberos is 
a centralized protocol and distributes tickets to all communicating parties which increases its 
processing time. Although SAML is a distributed authentication protocol, it does not support 
heterogeneous client attributes, and when used in a secure way (in conjunction with SSL) it 
takes longer than proposed protocol to perform authentication of multiple clients. Thus the 
purposed authentication solutions takes less time to handle large number of requests compared 





























Figure 4-7 Performance comparison of proposed authentication scheme in multi-cloud 
scenario 
To further improve the scalability during orchestration of MCC, its key component cloud 
controller is scaled and distributed to decouple its logical functionalities. Deploying cloud 
controller on a single VM can raise many challenges during large scale collaboration such as 
single point of failure and performance bottlenecks. Therefore, we distribute cloud controller 
to modular components based on their functionality. A message queue is used to manage 
incoming client requests and a separate task queue for facilitating collaboration among cloud 
controllers in multi-clouds. The message queue consumes requests from clients, and a 
messaging service forwards authentication requests and collaboration messages to foreign 
clouds. Therefore, the cloud controller can start processing users requests as soon as they arrive 
by having multiple instances. A large number of user tasks were created to check the 
performance of controller component in local cloud to set up collaboration across multiple 
clouds. Figure 4.8 shows the performance of cloud controller after many tasks are executed in 
























Comparison with standard authentication protocols





Figure 4-8 User request execution time with scaled controller component 
 
4.6 Summary 
To summarise, cloud has been widely adopted to deliver services, but it also introduces 
challenges due to the limitations of resources and services in a single cloud. This chapter 
provides an approach to establish secure collaboration across multi-clouds to access services 
running in the foreign cloud. A novel authentication scheme is presented by which 
communicating clouds can authenticate each other dynamically and SLA approach is used to 
ensure service execution in the foreign cloud is according to the agreed SLA parameters 
between the user and the provider. Various protocols are proposed for multi-cloud 
collaboration and verified formally. Moreover, we also present a detailed system design to 
implement these protocols. The experiments are performed on two cloud systems based on 



























Chapter 5 A Model for 
Orchestrating Efficient 
Service Selection and 
Dynamic Service Access in 
Multi-Clouds 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, service orchestration issues in multi-clouds along with 
many security concerns are a major barrier in their large-scale adoption and application. 
Consider a scenario in which a cloud (local cloud) user is accessing service located in another 
cloud (foreign cloud). That cloud user would have no mechanism to verify that the service 
being used is trustworthy and neither do they have insights on what is happening with their 
data being handled by services. In order to trust the cloud services, users depend on their 
assurances given by the cloud provider. Cloud providers give very limited evidence or 
accountability to users which offers them the ability to hide some behavior of the service.   
Another key challenge in multi-cloud collaboration is to develop solutions for multi-cloud that 
can enable the users to select most suitable service in foreign cloud according to their 
requirements as well as to ensure that services in the foreign cloud are compliant with the 
service level agreement (SLA) between user and cloud provider. In order to address these 




facilitate multi-cloud collaboration and provide guarantees to the user that the software or 
service (such as IoT service) running on a foreign cloud node is secure and the agreed service 
level agreements (SLAs) are not being violated.  
We provide a service selection algorithm to select the best service from multiple cloud 
providers that best match user quality of service requirements (QoS). In the next stage, service 
level agreements (SLAs) are used to ensure security and handle service execution in the foreign 
cloud. The usage of SLA mechanisms ensures that QoS parameters including the functional 
(CPU, RAM, memory etc.) and non-functional requirements (bandwidth, latency, availability, 
reliability etc.) of users for a particular service are negotiated and secure collaboration between 
multi-clouds is setup. The multi-cloud handling user requests will be responsible to enforce 
mechanisms that fulfil the QoS requirements agreed in the SLA. While the monitoring phase 
in SLA involves monitoring the service execution in the foreign cloud to check its compliance 
with the SLA and report it back to the user. Experiments indicate that the proposed approach 
supports collaboration among a large number of services across multi-clouds and incurs a 
minor overhead. 
The major contributions of this chapter are the following: 
• The proposed Multi-Cloud Collaboration (MCC) presented in the previous chapter is 
extended with additional functionalities to provide users with secure dynamic collaboration 
and access to services in multi-clouds. The protocols to support these functionalities and 
additional model components responsible for multi-cloud collaboration are presented. 
• A service selection protocol is proposed to select a foreign cloud provider that best matches 
user requirements. MCC achieves high accuracy by providing distance correlation 





• Mechanisms to set up service level agreements (SLAs) for multi-cloud collaboration have 
been presented. The various stages in setting up SLA include negotiation, enforcement and 
monitoring. They help in negotiating QoS parameters for services between the user and 
foreign cloud provider, enforce a mechanism to comply with the agreed SLAs, monitor 
client usage of service in the foreign cloud and report back any violation of SLA. 
• Dynamic and lightweight authentication protocol to set up single sign on (SSO) presented 
in the previous chapter is integrated within the system. Experiments have been carried out 
to check the efficiency of the proposed service service scheduling algorithm as well as the 
effectiveness of proposed SLA mechanisms in negotiation, enforcement and monitoring. 
5.2 Extension of Multi-Cloud Collaboration (MCC) Model 
Based on heterogeneous requirements of multi-clouds and services, we propose extensions to 
MCC that can enable dynamic collaboration between users and services in multi-clouds. The 
architecture of the proposed model involves various components that have been implemented 
in each participating cloud to achieve the secure multi cloud authentication. The additional 
components involved in system design are a scheduler to select suitable service meeting user 
specifications and SLA coordinator for managing SLA negotiation, enforcement and 
authorization. Figure 5.1 displays various components in a local cloud to communicate and 
collaborate with foreign clouds. All the system components serve different functions which are 





Figure 5-1 The extended Multi-Cloud Collaboration model 
5.2.1 Initialization and Authentication 
The initialization protocol is the first step that is used to set up the system services, parameters 
and attributes required for multi-cloud collaboration. It is responsible to boot the required 
services such as certificate generation, passing the client request to access multi-cloud service 
and launching services for the proposed model. The initialization protocol is similar to the one 
described earlier in chapter 4. 
The authentication protocol from chapter 4 is used in this model that can provide dynamic 
authentication between multi-clouds without initial agreement. The authentication protocol 
uses a single sign on (SSO) authentication mechanism by which any cloud user in the local 
cloud can authenticate itself with the foreign cloud, and access required resources. If the user 
is successfully authenticated, it is granted access to resources otherwise foreign cloud makes a 





5.2.2 Service Scheduling in MCC 
Cloud workloads are usually submitted in the form of jobs and may encompass one to several 
numbers of tasks. In a traditional cloud model, tasks from customers are received by cloud 
providers, who will then schedule and execute them in the server resources. Schedulers up on 
receiving the jobs, locate appropriate resources and place the jobs within virtual machines or 
containers deployed in the physical servers [126]. Despite the orchestration of a monumental 
number of server resources in a single datacentre, issues still exist owing to the increasing and 
diversified demands of customers, particularly for the cases of scientific and mission critical 
applications. Lack of resources in one common problem prevailing among small-scale service 
providers that directly lead to compromising service quality and affect their reputation. The 
traditional concept of a stand-alone datacentre applies mutual exclusion policies during 
resource constraints, whereby tasks or jobs with fewer priorities are pulled out of execution in 
order to avail uninterrupted services for priority jobs. Or the providers have to kill, fail or evict 
the less priority tasks during resource constraints, evicting low priority tasks temporarily pauses 
their execution to accommodate the execution of priority tasks. The development of scheduler 
for multi-cloud infrastructures nullifies lack of resources for processing jobs, by the way of 
promising anytime resource availability, namely providing users with the illusion of infinite 
pool of resources those can be availed through a collaborative multi-cloud infrastructure [127]. 
Multi-cloud collaboration paradigm can provide users uninterrupted access to services in 
foreign clouds. As the cloud services states can change dynamically during runtime, the 
collaboration between users in multi-clouds can make service automatic detection and access 
more complicated. Cloud customers can have varying requirements and in multi-cloud 
scenarios, best services that can meet their required quality of service (QoS) needs to be 




security mechanisms to ensure secure transmission of tasks for services access among different 
participating clouds is an integral requirement in any multi-cloud service infrastructure. 
5.2.2.1 MCC scheduling architecture: 
A de-centralised architecture is adopted for the meta-scheduling scheme among the 
participating clouds. To select the most suitable services, the first scheduling goal is the 
efficient discovery according to the characteristics of services advertised by foreign clouds. 
The root meta-scheduler in the local cloud initially communicates with the local cloud 
controller to get list of available resources in foreign clouds. Service discovery for dynamic 
multi-cloud collaboration could be hard due to requirements such as satisfying QoS, service 
functionalities and other metrics. There might be cases when a single service would be able to 
satisfy all user requirements and the service that matches most requirements might need to be 
selected. This leads to partial match-making where the service that matches most required QoS 
criteria will be selected. In this section, we propose an efficient and dynamic service scheduling 
algorithm for the selection of cloud services in multi-cloud scenarios based on partial or closest 
matching of service QoS attributes.   
The proposed scheduling algorithm has two essential characteristics.  
• Firstly, the proposed algorithm supports service selection among all services of multi 
clouds in a dynamic decentralized environment with high accuracy.  
• Secondly, different QoS requirements of services can be supported. In case, there is no 
exact match of user QoS requirements with available services, services matching the 
most requirements are selected using partial matching. The algorithm can handle a large 
number of services by using distance co-relation weighting mechanism and it can 
support various services QoS requirements such as response time, availability, 




5.2.2.2 Request description  
 
The process of service selection in MCC across multi-clouds starts with the user request being 
passed to service scheduling module which includes the required service and desired QoS. The 
local cloud controller receives a response from various foreign clouds that can deliver required 
services, and it communicates with the service scheduling module to select the required service. 
Such as a user SLA might include high throughput compared to cost saving while it might be 
opposite for another user.  
Here we represent various denotations for request types: 
• RQ represents a set of user functional QoS requirements, RQ= {q1, q2, q3, …., qn}, where 
n ε N 
• CK represents a set of available foreign clouds offering services with required 
functionality, CK = {c1, c2,………ck} where k ε N 
• S is a subset of CK i.e. available services across multi-clouds with similar functionality, 
S = {s1, s2, s3… sm}, where m ε N 
• Each service S has QS property matrices, QS = {QS1, QS2, QS3 … QSi}, where QSi = {qi1, 
qi2, qi3 …. qij}, i, j ε N. QSi represents quality matrices for service i.   
5.2.2.3 QoS analysis  
Once the QoS requirements have been gathered, the module collects all possible service offers 
and their associated QoS parameters. These are used to construct and rank an accuracy matrix 
for the calculation of offers. 
In an ideal scenario, user QoS requirements RQ must be similar to the QoS parameters 
mentioned in QSi. In other words, an ideal service for user request can be represented as, 




However, in a real case scenario that user requirements RQ and the number of quality matrices 
QSi will be different. Therefore, RQ is taken as a baseline and quality matrices could be arranged 
in the following way: 
• If the quality service matrix QSi lacks in the user RQ, it is removed and RQ is assigned 0 
To construct an accuracy matrix, n consumers request RQ which are identified along with m 
available services that can satisfy user requirements, and an m*n matrix is constructed which 
is called R. The columns in the matrix represent QoS parameters RQ while each available 
service is represented in a row for the selection process. 
Requirement matrix, R can be defined as: 
 
(
𝑟11 𝑟12 … 𝑟1𝑛
𝑟21 𝑟22 … 𝑟2𝑛
… … … …
𝑟𝑚1 𝑟𝑚2 … 𝑟𝑚𝑛
) 
 
A service not satisfying the mandatory QoS requirements RQ is removed from the selection 
process. 
5.2.2.4 Priority computation of services across multi-clouds  
To perform priority computation of services, QoS based ranking is incorporated in MCC. The 
local cloud can choose the most optimum foreign cloud to send the requests for providing users 
access to services across multiple foreign clouds. This prioritises the foreign cloud selection 
depending on the customised requirements of individual requests, which could be energy-





RQ1      RQ2        …       RQn 




The priority calculation of the services in different multi-clouds is computed using accuracy 
matrix A, which is dependent on the tendency of QoS parameters. This tendency describes how 
the numeric value of a user QoS parameters changes for a service to be observed as better. It 
indicates whether high or low values of a QoS parameter are preferred in an ideal case. For 
example, an ideal service will require high availability and throughput while its response time 
and latency should be low. The scheduling of tasks according to QoS parameters in various 
clouds depicted in the figure 5.2 below. 
 
Using the user described QoS range and offered service QoS, elements of the accuracy matrix 
are calculated using case dependent formulae as mentioned in the equations below: 
For values with high tendency: 
Qij   when  Qij < Q1  
Q1 
 
Qij - Q1 + α 
Qh – Q1 
 
Qij  + β  when Qij > Qh 
Qmax 





For values with low tendency: 
 
Qh  when Qij > Qh 
Qij 
 
Qh - Qij  + α  when  Q1 ≤ Qij ≤ Qh 
Qh – Q1 
 
Qmin + β when Qij < Q1 
Qij 
 
In the above equations, Qij is the value of ith QoS property of jth service, Q1 is the lower limit 
of user requirements for an attribute, Qh is the highest limit of user requirements for an attribute. 
Qmax and Qmin are respectively the maximum and minimum values of a QoS property being 
offered by a service. α and β belong to {1, 2, 3, …} where α < β. The results from the above 
equations are normalized in the range [0, 1].  
α and β are used to differentiate between loose range, preferred range and tight range. The 
preferred range for any service is between Q1 and Qh. If a value falls in this range, α is added 
to normalize the value so that results are in range (α, α + 1). The values in the loose range 
(between Qmin and Q1 for high tendency parameters, and between Qh and Qmax for low tendency 
parameters) are normalized between 0 and 1. While the values in the tight range (between Qh 
and Qmax for high tendency parameters, and between Qmin and Q1 for low tendency parameters) 
are normalized by adding β so that results are in the range (β, β +1). Therefore, for all the values 
in accuracy matrix lie between (0, β +1) which helps in consistency. Moreover, β > α which 





The results are used to calculate the accuracy matrix A. It shows how precisely each service 
matches the user requirements. After constructing the accuracy matrix, the rank of each service 
can be calculated in the following way: 
Ri = ∑  𝒎𝒌=𝟏  ∑ 𝑨𝒊𝒋 ∗ 𝑾𝒋 ∗ 𝒙𝒊𝒋𝒌 
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏   
In the above equation, Ri represents the rank of the service i, Aij represents the accuracy value 
of the jth QoS property of service i, and Wj represents the weight of the j
th QoS property. xijk = 
1 if the user is assigned access to service Si in the foreign cloud Ck otherwise it is 0. Once the 
tasks are processed in the foreign cloud, the outputs are sent to the local cloud via respective 
root meta-schedulers and controllers. 
 
5.2.2.5 Benefits of the Proposed Model 
The de-centralised scheme of scheduling proposed in this chapter facilitates the foreign cloud 
to take a measurable control of the tasks received from the local cloud. This helps the scheduler 
in the foreign cloud to act as a master to coordinate with its respective local resources to place 
and allocate the tasks for processing. In this distributed architecture of scheduling, schedulers 
are responsible for resource management of their responsible server clusters in the datacentres. 
If certain resources fail, then their respective clusters can be replaced by other resources until 























2. Data: Input: <Client functional and non-functional QoS requirements (CR)>,  
 <List of services (LS)> 
3. Cloud LF= {1, 2,…., k}; // Total list of available foreign clouds 
4. Service LS = {1,2,…, n}; // Total list of available services across foreign clouds  
5. <Service,CR> ServiceContenderList (SCL) = NULL //List of services satisfying requirements                
across various foreign clouds 
6. Cloud C=NULL // Single cloud instance 
5. Service S=NULL // Single service instance 
6. CR Q=NULL //Single QoS requirement 
7. <Service, CR> O=NULL; 
8. For each C in LF: 
9.  For each S in LS do: 
9.  if (Satisfy(S ,CR)) //Add to SCL all appropriate services matching user requirements  
10.  SCL.add (S,CR) 
11. end if 
12. end for 
13. For each O in SCL do: 
14. for each Q in O.CR do:  
15.  Normalize (AccuracyMatrix (Max(Q),Min(Q) )) //Generate accuracy matrix  
16. end for  
17. end for  
18. For each O in SCL: 
19.  Score = Calculate_Score(O.Service ) // Calculate score of each service  
20. end for  
21. SCL.sort(Score) // Rank all services in SCL 







5.2.3 SLA Negotiation 
The SLA coordinator receives user requirements and SLA’s from the foreign cloud and 
negotiates a dynamic SLA between them. These SLAs exist within the customer domain that 
wants to access foreign cloud resources. From the client viewpoint, SLAs define the 
mechanisms to securely access services while the SLAs are utilized by cloud administrators to 
manage the mechanisms to offer cloud services. SLA-coordinator negotiates the SLAs on 
behalf of the user if there is the full match of QoS requirements in the stated SLAs. However, 
as described earlier there might be a partial match after which user can have the ability to 
negotiate SLAs itself. Therefore, SLA coordinator component in MCC offers added features 
to customers such as negotiating an SLA or switching to a new provider in a multi-cloud 
scenario if selected provider and user cannot agree on an SLA.  
As discussed earlier, scheduling component checks the service specs like base service, features, 
cost and recommends them to user. SLA Negotiation involves agreeing on the service terms 
for SLA and QoS parameters, measuring metrics (service level objectives) and defining how 
the metrics will be measured. While service providers also check if they can provide requested 
service and perform basic risk evaluation in case. As provider reputation is on a stake if it fails 
to provide the service agreed in SLA. 
Integrating the security parameters within SLAs is a novel problem and a very limited research 
has been done in this area. For the case of secure multi-cloud collaboration, we propose a 
service level objective (SLO) called service identity which can help customers to negotiate the 




5.2.3.1 Service Identity 
Service identity as an important property to maintain strong service security and compliance in 
a foreign cloud. A set j services Fj deployed on a single cloud platform with functional 
properties Funci and non-functional properties NFunci can be defined as: 
Fi = {Funci, NFunci}  1 ≤ i ≤ j 
During service execution in a foreign cloud, both functional and non-functional properties of 
service instances being used by users must be maintained. Functional properties of instances 
that could be violated include a change in the code or implementation of service to make it do 
certain other activities affecting the original behavior of service. While a few non-functional 
issues can include service taking more processing time, charging more cost than agreed or 
remaining unavailable during required times.  
If F is the original service deployed by the service provider in cloud after agreeing SLAs and 
F’ is the instance of that service running in cloud that is being used by client, the service identity 
can be satisfied only if F=F’ holds true for that particular instance of F running in the cloud 
during the entire lifecycle of F from deployment to decommissioning. The service identity can 
be described by the following equation: 
F ≡ F’ … (a) 
In order for functional properties of a service instance F’ to hold, its functional properties must 
be same as original instance. While the case for non-functional properties is more complex as 
the service states can change dynamically during runtime. Moreover, each user will have 
different QoS requirements from a service. As an example, users X and Y using different 
instances F’ of same service F can have varying availability, and cost requirements. Therefore, 
we define a threshold value for non-functional parameters of a service instance that it must 




The non-functional parameters of a service agreed in the SLA can be defined as tuple: 
NFunc = {Mini, Maxi, Wi} 0 ≤ i ≤ l 
i is the QoS parameter, Min and Max show the accepted boundaries or threshold values for that 
parameter, and W denotes the weight assigned to a particular parameter by user which shows 
the importance given to that parameter by user. If i is not defined, it is given value of 0.5 that 
shows medium importance to that parameter. In order for non-functional properties to hold true 
in an instance, the following condition must be satisfied at all times: 
Mini ≤ NFunci ≤ Maxi … (b) 
To comply with functional requirements such as security different techniques can be agreed in 
the SLA which can ensure that functional behaviour of service instances F’ will not change. 
For example, to maintain the service identity trusted platform module (TPM) mechanism could 
be used. The functional property of a service could be defined as:  
F-F’ = Ø … (c) 
If both equations (b) and (c) hold than equation (a) will hold. However, in case if service 
security is compromised than the equation will become F’ ⊃ F meaning that service identity 
does not hold.  
Meanwhile, various authors have proposed definitions of other functional and non-functional 
metrics (SLOs) for services that can be agreed between customer and provider during SLA 
negotiation. These parameters include request latency, availability, accessibility, service 
throughput, completion time, and mean times to repair and failure, energy cost and financial 
cost.  
The proposed system uses WSDL to express the functional security requirements and non-




document, the service interface definition and its implementation. Therefore, QoS tags are 
associated with a new category to recognize security and other properties. The protocols for 
SLA management are implemented in the form of a REST based service and API. 
5.2.4 SLA Enforcement 
Once a user is authorized to access cloud resources, the next stage is the enforcement of security 
mechanisms by the provider. In this stage, mechanisms are implemented that can guarantee 
SLA assurances. The enforcement of agreed SLA is done in two stages. First stage involves 
implementing the software modules that can be activated for the acquisition of resources for 
enforcing security policies and second stages involve dynamic reconfiguration of the resources 
after a security alert is generated. 
This research focuses on the implementation of mechanisms for non-functional properties of 
services to ensure that service complies with the defined SLA policy. The enforcement of 
policies for SLA enforcement is done by foreign cloud in its infrastructure by acquiring enough 
resources for service execution and employing the required mechanisms. QoS parameters 
mentioned in SLAs are measured by maintaining current system configuration information and 
runtime information of parameters that are part of SLOs (measurable metrics). Depending on 
the client requirements some or all SLA parameters could be measured, and SLOs such as 
request latency or service throughput could be measured by retrieving resource metrics.  
Development of mechanisms for maintaining functional property is not in the scope of this 
thesis. We discuss various mechanisms that exist in the literature that could be deployed for 
secure service execution such as trusted computing. Trusted computing is paradigm used to 
enforce trustworthy behaviour of computing platforms. It is based on using a hardware crypto-
processor module named Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [128]. This feature can be used to 




mechanisms for cloud computing based on TPM have been proposed that are used for the 
security of services, data and other resources. Excalibur [109] is a system that can be used to 
design trusted computing services for the cloud. It uses policy sealed data (data encrypted 
according to customer policy) that can only be unsealed (decrypted) by nodes whose 
configuration match the node policy. Excalibur uses Attribute Based Encryption to bind 
policies and attributes to node configurations. A mechanism that uses a hardened hypervisor to 
attest that the image of the VM running on a cloud node is the same as the one uploaded 
originally by the service provider and initiated by cloud was proposed by Santos N. et al.  [129]. 
It confines the execution of VM to secure nodes inside the cloud and guarantees that even the 
system admin with root privileges cannot tamper with the VM memory. Some other 
recommendations provided by NIST for hardening the hypervisor include maintaining proper 
isolation, separating the duties of administrative functions and restricting administrator access 
to security checks [130]. 
5.2.5 SLA Monitoring 
Currently, no solutions exist to check for SLA compliance for user support. However, 
researchers have recommended using the monitoring mechanisms to check for SLA 
compliance on the cloud provider which involves two basic activities. The first one is the 
verification that SLAs are respected via access to underlying infrastructure that is inaccessible 
to users. Once SLAs are measured they are compared to the thresholds agreed in the SLA. 
While other is the generation of alerts if SLAs are broken to inform enforcement layer to 
activate countermeasures that can protect services.  
Monitoring could either be performed by the client from data received from the cloud provider 
or by cloud provider at the infrastructure level which is the focus of this chapter. The input to 
monitoring component provided by a cloud provider is the formal requirements to be monitored 




events that could occur during service execution and imply SLA violation. In the proposed 
system uses event driven modules to collect all generated events and performs required 
filtration operations before analysing them. The description of event captors and monitor is 
used to monitor the SLA parameter.  
The analysis is performed based on captured events to check if any generated events show an 
SLA violation. If a security violation is reported by the monitoring component, it logs the event 
and estimates the current status of service. Monitor also reports to the user if the foreign cloud 
is compliant with the signed SLA or not.  In the case of SLA violations, the user can enforce 
penalties on the provider. 
5.3 MCC Design  
This section explains the workflow for the overall model and the implementation details of 
various components. A user request to connect to the foreign cloud for accessing a service is 
received by cloud controller that advertises request to connect to multiple foreign clouds and 
receives their responses. Scheduler selects the best provider based on user QoS requirements. 
The authenticator is responsible for authentication while the SLA coordinator is responsible 
for SLA management. The details of components such as controller, authenticator and trusted 
party have been described earlier in section 4.3.2. The workflow of the proposed system is 

































Figure 5-3 Workflow of the extended MCC model 
This section explains the workflow for the overall system and the implementation details of 
various components. The overall process for cloud selection, negotiation and SLA compliance 
is managed is managed in the following three stages: 
1. A user request to connect to the foreign cloud is received by cloud controller. This 
request has a list of required service QoS parameters that enable local cloud to find an 
appropriate foreign cloud that can meet client requirements. 
2. Local cloud advertises this connection request to multiple foreign clouds and receives 
their responses that are passed to the match-making module. These responses contain 
the various service offers from foreign clouds in the form of advertised SLAs and local 
cloud controller stores them in its repository. 
3. The scheduling component in local cloud controller finds the best matching service 
meeting the user requirements. In case of non-matching or partial matching, the results 
are returned to the user with recommended service that can agree or disagree to use the 
recommended service, and cancel the connection request or wait for service availability.  
4. The scheduling component performs the service selection and recommends it to the 





cloud. The user is authenticated by foreign and authorization is also performed. To 
perform authentication we have developed a lightweight SSO solution. 
5. After authentication, SLA negotiation on the behalf of the user. Once access is granted, 
SLA enforcement is done in the foreign cloud to provide service that complies with 
QoS requirements of user agreed in the SLA. 
6. SLA monitoring is carried out in the foreign cloud to ensure that all QoS parameters as 
well as the functional and non-functional requirements of user are satisfied as per the 
SLA. In case of violation, monitoring component records it and informs the user. 
5.4 Experiments and Results 
5.4.1 Evaluation 
To examine the feasibility of the proposed design empirically, it was implemented on two 
different clouds mentioned in experimental setup. Web applications are used to assess use case 
scenarios as they represent the most common type of application domain in cloud today along 
with other transactional applications.  
The first goal of the evaluation is to determine the performance of the system with an increased 
number of services requests, to calculate the overall increase in user request processing time and 
determine the impact on various operations in the model as the user’s requests increase. While 
the second goal of the experiments is to check the efficiency of proposed model MCC by 
measuring events through monitoring that are generated during collaboration between multi-
clouds. Various measurement intervals are used to measure changing behaviour of an 
application during its execution. This helps us in determining optimal measurement interval for 




Another goal of the evaluation is to determine the number of violations that occur for a pre-
defined set of SLA metrics. To detect the violations in a system, SLA thresholds are setup 
based on historical data and resource consumption data of that particular kind of applications. 
SLA violation during service execution can occur due to unpredicted resource usage by a 
service or due to the fact the SLAs might have been agreed on service usage and provider might 
assign VM hosting that service to another user that can reduce resource availability. This can 
help the provider to estimate a possible number of violations for an SLA metric and take 
precautionary measures so that these violations can be reduced. We calculate SLA violations 
for different measurement intervals and determine the best intervals to measure SLA violations. 
The costing function is proposed to calculate the cost of missing SLA violations if higher 
measurement intervals are used. Moreover, to show the scalability of MCC scheduling module 
experiments are carried out to show it can schedule job with high accuracy and minimal 
performance overhead. 
5.4.2 Experimental Setup 
The prototype was tested on two different cloud infrastructures. One of the cloud infrastructures 
was an OpenStack cloud based in University of Derby. This setup consists of six server 
machines. Each machine has 12 cores with two 6-core Intel Xeon processors running at 2.4 GHz 
with 32 GB RAM and 2 TB storage capacity. The cloud nodes on which the experiments were 
performed had 4 VCPUs running at 2.4 GHz each, 8 GB RAM, and data storage of 100 GB per 
node. The second cloud was also based on Amazon AWS. The cloud nodes on this machine had 
4 VCPUs, 8 GB RAM and 100 GB storage.  
Both the Cloud Controller and Cloud Authenticator are employed as web services which help 
in avoiding tightly bound security. While WS-Agreement was used to implement the SLA 
components. To enable the interaction among components in prototype according to the 




clouds. When the foreign cloud controller initializes and receives a request for available 
services from a local cloud, it shares exchange information about available services and their 
characteristics. The web application to which user requires access in the foreign cloud is a 
spring boot application developed using REST services and hosted on a Tomcat server. And 
the database setup for this application is a MySQL database developed using Java Persistence 
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Figure 5-4 Experimental Setup between OpenStack and AWS 
5.4.3 Experiments 
As mentioned earlier, web applications are used to assess the model as they represent a common 
class of applications. Initially, the setup is performed by using user requests, authentication and 
authorization in MCC similar to experiments in the previous chapter. 
We defined six SLA parameters for the web application as the quality of service requirements 
that must be guaranteed during system execution. These QoS requirements were divided into 
functional requirements and non-functional requirements which are described in table 1. In 
these experiments, SLA formalization is not addressed, and the focus is on specifying SLA 
requirements which are commonly defined and used for managing user services. These 




using their historical data that determines the resources required for that service (functional 
requirements) and also the QoS parameters (non-functional) that are most critical for these type 
of services to achieve maximum performance.  
The evaluation scenario is presented in figure 5.4. The web application is a spring boot 
application built with REST services and deployed on a Tomcat server. The virtual machines 
are deployed on the foreign cloud that can execute the service with its required resources to 
serve clients request. The allocated VM executes web application according to the functional 
and non-functional requirements which specified using the WSDL and launches the 
application.  
The measure the effectiveness of SLA-coordinator events generated during service execution 
are continuously monitored to detect SLA violation. The low-level metrics are constantly been 
checked to verify if there is any violation. To perform monitoring, pre-defined set of rules and 
values expressed in WSDL format are compared with the monitored resources used during web 
application execution. To monitor functional parameters the common application metrics such 
as CPU, storage and memory usage are calculated while for non-functional parameters low-
level metrics are calculated using a monitoring agent which captures runtime events and 
compares them with the SLA parameters threshold to detect a violation. During application 
execution custom events can be generated that have event-specific information, and they are 
transported locally using API calls and remotely through Java Messaging Service (JMS). 
Events are generated by event generators which in this case is the Java code executed in the 
VM and that writes them to the respective event stream. The collected events are then filtered, 
aggregated and processed using event co-relation to generate metric values that are stored in 
the database. We pre-defined a set of events that can be compared with these runtime events 




The information regarding time taken by each process is also measured, and user and foreign 
cloud provider SLAs are sent to the foreign cloud provider. Once user is authenticated and 
makes a request to access resource virtual machines are configured and services are assigned 
to those VMs that run it according to agreed SLAs.  
5.4.4 Results 
The web application is a spring boot application using REST API that is designed to perform 
simulated activities of a business (shopping) hosted on a Tomcat server. The database 
implemented is MySQL developed using Java Persistence API (JPA) that stores the application 
client and products details. To manage the MySQL database RDS instances are used in the 
foreign cloud. The workload on web application included multiple sessions to handle different 
transactions, database requests for data access, update and deletion while maintaining accuracy 
and security. The SLA parameters defined for this service and agreed between user and 
provider during SLA negotiation are divided between functional and non-functional 
requirements. The non-functional requirements include accessibility, throughput and 
availability while the functional requirements are CPU usage, memory usage and storage. Any 
utilization of resources not between these thresholds is regarded as an SLA violation. 
During web application execution, monitoring is performed and several measurement intervals 
are set to detect the violations in a particular time period. The measurement intervals are chosen 
to monitor the changing behaviour of an application during its execution as shown in table 5.1. 
Measurement 
Interval 




Events Measured  1619 1333 1070 797 538 259 52 






A total number of violations detected for each measurement interval for the number of QoS 
metric agreed in SLA for a defined time interval.  For each parameter, the number of detected 
violations in a time interval are shown in figures 5.5 to 5.8. While the total number of recorded 
events and violations in each stage are shown in figure 5.9. These results show that our system 
can monitor events during service execution and find any SLA violations. The table 5.2 shows 
the total number of SLA violations and the total number of events captured. 
 






Figure 5-6 SLA Violations of Throughput at various time intervals 
 














25 sec Total Events: 1619 
Number of Violations: 181 
50 sec Total Events: 1333 
Number of Violations: 167 
100 sec Total Events: 1070 
Number of Violations: 130 
150 sec Total Events: 797 
Number of Violations: 103 
200 sec Total Events: 538 
Number of Violations: 62 
250 sec Total Events: 259 
Number of Violations: 41 
300 sec Total Events: 52 
Number of Violations: 8 









Figure 5-9 The number of events measured in a time interval and recorded SLA violations 
 
Along with the number of violations, the number of undetected SLA violations are also 
determined. As each measurement interval is supposed to capture all SLA violations, 
undetected violations for an interval are calculated by finding the difference between total SLA 
violations for an interval and actually captured violations in that interval. This leads to 
determine the cost of SLA violations that can be recorded for measurement intervals. The cost 
analysis is helpful to determine the best measurement interval for SLA monitoring in MCC that 
can capture violations at acceptable performance overhead.   
To measure the number of undetected violations we compare the number of measured 
violations with violations measured in the reference interval. As reference interval of 25 
seconds is used, violations of each other interval are compared with it to detect the number of 
undetected violations. Using a lower measurement interval than 25 seconds can increase the 
measured events, however it massively increases the system overhead as shown in figure 5.11. 
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overhead. Therefore, considering cost and system overhead, 25 seconds interval is chosen as 
the minimum and optimum measurement interval. 
Using the cost function defined in [131], we can also determine the cost of SLA measurements. 
The cost function is defined as: 
Cost (C) = 𝛂 ∗  𝐂𝐦 + ∑ µ (𝛃) ∗  𝐂𝐯 𝛃𝛜{𝐦𝐞𝐦𝐨𝐫𝐲,𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐚𝐠𝐞,𝐚𝐯𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲..}  
In the above equation, α denotes the total number of SLA measurements, and Cm is the cost of 
these measurements. µ (β) denotes the number of undetected SLA violations and Cv represents 
the cost of missed SLA violations. This function helps us to analyse the results and determine 
the measurements cost of application mentioned above. The factors Cm and Cv in the above 
equations represent cost values which are agreed for each particular type of application. As a 
web application is being used in our case, SLA violations could have a huge impact on 
performance such as slowing it down so missing an SLA violation has a higher cost. On the 
other hand, measurements to detect SLA violations only focus on server monitoring and incur 
lower overhead so they have comparatively lower cost. Therefore, we derive the cost values 
using cost functions and assign values of $0.10 and $0.20 respectively for measuring an SLA 
violation and missing a violation. These values are not standard values and are determined 
using the cost function methods described in the literature [132]. 
 As mentioned earlier, the reference interval used in 25 seconds and the assumption is that all 
violations are measured in this interval. Therefore, in 25 seconds interval, there is no cost of 
missing an SLA violation. By using the cost function, the results are given in the figures 5.10 





Figure 5-10 Time interval in seconds vs Cost of missing violations in $ 
 
 






















The results show that the cost of measurement increases as the measurement intervals are 
increased. This is due to the fact the for higher measurement intervals the number of missed 
SLA violations is very high. Therefore, based on the results 25 seconds measurement interval 
could be considered as the best interval showing the web applications are sensitive and require 
continuous monitoring to ensure that SLA requirements are satisfied. Missing the SLA 
violations will lead to a higher cost to the provider. 
To determine the performance overhead caused by the purposed system, we calculated the time 
taken by different stages which is used in determining time taken by various measurement 
stages. The various stages for which overhead was measured are mapping the agreed QoS 
parameters in SLA with the metrics to be monitored, monitoring application execution in a 
virtual machine, and processing the monitored data to log events and report violations. These 
measurements indicate the performance intensive operations and are useful in determining 
acceptable level of measurement intervals in terms of performance overhead. As shown in the 
figure 5.12 below, the overhead is maximum for least measurement interval and gradually 
decreases with the increase in the measurement interval.  
 
 





To check the scalability and efficiency of the service selection algorithm, a large number of user 
service selection requests (tasks) were created , and the algorithm was successfully able to select 
the service with the highest match of QoS properties using the scheduling algorithm. Moreover, 
using the scheduling algorithm the selected foreign cloud was used to forward user requests to 
access a particular service matching QoS properties. Results shown in figure 5.13 elaborate that 
the scheduling algorithm is efficient and scalable. Moreover, the scheduling algorithm has been 
compared with traditional scheduling algorithm FCFS and our alogrithm showed 22 percent 






























To measure the performance SLA co-ordinator and effectiveness of monitoring we did 
experiments to measure the accuracy monitoring component during service execution in the 
foreign cloud. A basic user interface (UI) was created on the client side to report any SLA 
violations of the SLA metrics. Figure 5.14 shows the client UI after accessing a few services in 
the foreign cloud. The boxes in red are SLA violations that were captured while green boxes 
indicate the SLA parameters that were successfully implemented and followed.  
5.5 Limitations 
To determine the valid threshold of an SLA parameter for an application we used historical 
data. Our experiments are based on web applications for which we defined thresholds for 
parameters such as availability, throughput and accessibility. However, these thresholds might 
change for various kinds of applications and for providing user access to certain kinds of 
applications in a foreign cloud using MCC, their historical data will need to be determined for 
having valid thresholds. Moreover, to determine the cost of measurements and defining the 
best measurement interval we focused on web applications as they represent a popular class of 
applications in cloud. The measurement interval of 25 sec was concluded as the best interval 
Figure 5-14 UI of client side showing SLA parameters compliance in foreign cloud (Red color 




with the least measurement cost and the highest number of detected SLA violations, however, 
the most suitable time interval might change for other applications.  
5.6 Summary 
To summarise, multi clouds offer a promising solution to efficiently deliver services but their 
adoption also raises challenges due to lack of supporting frameworks. This chapter provides an 
extension of the proposed model to establish secure collaboration across multi-clouds to access 
services running in the foreign cloud. Service scheduling technique is proposed to select the 
best service matching user requirements among multiple foreign clouds, and SLA approach is 
used to ensure service execution in the foreign cloud is according to the agreed SLA parameters 
between user and the provider. Moreover, we also present a detailed system design to 
implement these protocols and model. The experiments are performed on two cloud systems 
based on OpenStack and Amazon AWS and the results show that our protocols only result in 
a limited overhead. Furthermore, our results indicate that smaller measurement intervals lead 






Chapter 6 Conclusion and 
Future Work 
6.1 Overview 
This chapter comprises of two parts. In the first part, we present the conclusions derived from 
our research. We describe our research goals, major contributions and the results achieved 
during this research. In the later part of this chapter, the future directions of our research work 
are discussed. 
6.2 Major Contributions 
Cloud has been widely adopted to deliver services, but it also introduces challenges due to the 
limitations of resources and services in a single cloud. Multi-clouds offer a promising solution to 
efficiently deliver services, but their adoption also raises challenges due to lack of supporting 
frameworks. A comprehensive literature review was carried out in the area of cloud computing 
and multi-clouds to critically review the existing methodologies in multi-cloud collaborations. 
We analysed state-of-the-art research mechanisms for multi-cloud environments and identified 
research gaps in multi-cloud collaboration, which reflects the first objective of this thesis. This 
literature review directed the research in two core areas: firstly, developing security mechanisms 
that can ensure the dynamic collaboration between multi-clouds depending on user requirements 




secure the communication that has been established between multi-clouds starting from 
authentication, authorization, and service selection followed by its execution in foreign cloud. 
In the second phase of this research threat modelling of services in cloud computing was carried 
out. In this thesis, the threat modelling approach has been presented to determine the threats 
for cloud services. Along with the important threats to services, this research also presents the 
methodologies to exploit those threats. Different possible attackers who can exploit specific 
threats have also been identified. The threat model presents a holistic picture of services 
security in the cloud through structured analysis in which security requirements, threats and 
attacks on cloud services correspond to each other. Threat modelling of services can be 
generalized to determine the threats for specific service interfaces user is accessing so that 
possible security mechanisms for those interfaces can be implemented. Moreover, this model 
can be used to determine potential threats in relation to a foreign cloud architecture in which 
user will be accessing services. 
The third objective has been achieved across chapter 4. Here, the novel multi-cloud collaboration 
(MCC) model is proposed that provides an approach to establish secure collaboration across 
multi-clouds to access services running in the foreign cloud. An authentication scheme to 
establish dynamic authentication between communicating clouds is presented based on a single 
sign on (SSO) authentication mechanism by which any cloud user in the local cloud can 
authenticate itself with foreign cloud and access required resources. It offers an end to end 
cryptographic solution for multi-clouds and satisfies the pre-requisites of multi-cloud 
collaboration such as having no prior trust provisioning. Various secure collaboration protocols 
are proposed for MCC and formally verified using the BAN logic. Moreover, we also present the 
detailed model design to implement these protocols. The experiments are performed on two cloud 




overhead compared to traditional security protocols such as SAML and Kerberos. The 
implementation of key MCC components such as controller into various modular components 
allows to handle higher request loads and reduces failures risks. 
The fourth objective of our research is achieved across chapter 5. It presents an extended version 
of the model MCC detailed in the previous chapter and provides additional features such as 
service scheduling and service level agreement (SLA). Service scheduling is proposed to select 
the best service matching user quality of service (QoS) requirements among a dynamic 
decentralized multi-clouds environment comprising multiple foreign clouds with high accuracy. 
By using the distance co-relation weighting mechanism our model can support various services 
QoS requirements such as response time, availability, reliability, throughput and latency. The 
SLA approach is used to ensure service execution in a foreign cloud is according to the agreed 
SLA (including both functional and non-functional) parameters between the user and the 
provider. The experiments were performed on two cloud systems based on OpenStack and 
Amazon AWS and various measurement intervals are used to measure changing behavior of an 
application during its execution. We calculated SLA violations for different measurement 
intervals and determine the best intervals to measure SLA violations, and considering cost and 
system overhead the 25 seconds interval is chosen as the minimum and optimum measurement 
interval. This is due to the fact the for higher measurement intervals the number of missed SLA 
violations is very high. Moreover, the scalability and accuracy of the scheduling algorithm was 
examined and it was successfully able to select the service with the highest match of QoS 
properties using accuracy matrix. 
The proposed model is an architectural solution that can be deployed by the organization on 




the proposed system with big data applications like IoT and E-Healthcare along with presenting 
the model for using proposed model (MCC) for meta-scheduling in multi-clouds.  
6.3 Future Work 
In the proposed work, chapter 3 proposes a threat model for the identification of security threats 
to different service functionalities in the presence of a specific attacker. Based on the threat 
model, “automated reasoning techniques” can be applied on the model to determine possible 
threats for a service interface and determine the best security mechanisms to secure that service 
in the event of those possible threats. Using semantic analysis and automated reasoning can 
help increase portability and interoperability when multiple parties such as cloud users, 
providers and administrators are involved. Although having additional security features can 
impact the performance of the system, implementing necessary mechanisms to protect services 
and data from most critical threats can significantly decrease the impact of an attack on a 
service. 
In chapters 4 and 5, the MCC model has been proposed for providing the users with dynamic 
and secure access to services running in the foreign cloud. In the experiments section of chapter 
4, it is discussed that controller needs to be implemented as a modular component and a 
messaging service forwards authentication requests and collaboration messages to foreign 
clouds. In order to manage large number of requests in MCC, “load balancing” techniques for 
cloud can be applied to make decisions based on incoming load and manage efficient 
networking such as task migration. Moreover, integrating load balancing with scheduling 
module can help to ensure required QoS metrics are maintained by efficient allocation of tasks 




Along with load balancing, “fault tolerance” techniques can be applied to modular MCC 
architecture to catch a fault at runtime (which may be due to hardware, software faults, or 
malicious attackers) and deal with it without affecting system performance. For a multi-cloud 
collaboration and orchestration, fault detection can be implemented at local cloud in controller 
(hardware, software) and scheduler (task) level. Other faults such as third party authenticator 
failure or network congestion can also be added. Moreover, fault prevention and recovery can 
be implemented at scheduler (task) level or user level in which exceptions can be defined based 
on SLAs or QoS requirements to validate proper execution.  
The MCC model gives users the ability to access particular services in foreign clouds which is 
a significant advantage to cloud users. However, currently very limited pricing models have 
been proposed for multi clouds that can provide an accurate estimate to users about the cost of 
using services dynamically. “Pricing models” for multiple clouds need to incorporate rates for 
leasing, QoS delivery, SLA management, security and management costs. Developing the 
pricing models for dynamic collaboration and integrating with the proposed model can benefit 
organizations in moving towards multi-cloud adoption and maximize the revenues. The pricing 
models can be incorporated with scheduling techniques to chose an optimal cloud with 
reasonable price. 
In chapter 5, we discuss that to ensure the functional security properties of services in foreign 
cloud various architectures have been proposed. Although hardware techniques such as Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) can be employed to ensure secure service execution, they have 
considerable performance issues. Therefore, “enhanced cryptograph-based software 
mechanisms” can be developed to secure functional properties of services and applications 









The proposed model is based on an architectural solution that can be used to setup multi-cloud 
collaboration between any clouds irrespective of their underlying implementation. In this 
chapter, we present the cases of applying the proposed model to real-world scenarios like meta-
scheduling in multi-clouds, e-health and Internet of Things (IoT). We also describe the benefits 
of applying the proposed model to these applications. 
 
A.2 Orchestrating Dynamic and Secure Access of IoT Services across 
Multi-Clouds Using MCC 
The Internet of Things (IoT)  devices have complex requirements but their limitations in terms 
of storage, network, computing, data analytics, scalability and big data management require 
them to be used it with a technology like cloud computing. IoT backend with cloud computing 
can present new ways to offer services that are massively scalable, can be dynamically 
configured, and delivered on demand with large-scale infrastructure resources. However, a 




in which hundreds of users might be accessing cloud resources, leading to a big data problem 
and the need for efficient frameworks to handle large amount of user requests for IoT services.  
These challenges require new functional elements and provisioning schemes. To this end, we 
propose the usage of proposed system for multi-cloud collaboration with IoT technologies. 
This can optimise the user requirements by allowing them to choose best IoT services from 
many services hosted in various cloud platforms, and provide them with more infrastructure 
and platform resources to meet their requirements. We present a novel model for dynamic and 
secure IoT services access across multi-clouds using cloud on-demand model. 
A.2.1 Motivation for IoT Services Access across Multi-Clouds 
The Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm has revolutionized the IT industry by bringing together 
technologies such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), Wireless Sensor and Actor 
Networks (WSANs) and ubiquitous computing domains. Internet of Things (IoT) connects 
billions of devices over the Internet. The heterogeneous IoT objects are provided with sensing 
and actuation capabilities, that enable them to capture information from physical objects and 
send it as data streams [134]. Moreover, IoT objects directly co-operate with physical and 
virtual resources over the internet to deliver data and functionalities to end users and 
applications.  
IoT has played a critical role in advancing human lives by bringing applications with usage in 
real world. From user’s perspective, IoT plays a critical role in application scenarios such as 
smart homes, healthcare, vehicular networks, and enhanced learning. While from business view 
point, the major applications of IoT are in the areas of logistics, transportation, agriculture, 
retail and smart cities. It is predicted that the growth of global IoT services market will be at a 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 24 percent until 2021 [135]. As the number of IoT 
devices increases and they generate large volumes of big data, it brings forwards the challenges 




Cloud computing has been proposed as a solution that can potentially solve the problem of 
managing big data in IoT [136]. In particular, the multi-cloud architecture can provide a 
solution to handling IoT big data as well as the variety and proliferation of its services offers. 
In terms of IoT, the services to be shared between multi-clouds can include SaaS, PaaS or IaaS 
service while the clients using these services can be other clouds, organizations or a single user. 
A.2.2 Using MCC to Access IoT Services  
In this section, we propose an architecture called MC-IoT to provide users with an ability to 
dynamically access IoT services across multi-clouds. In an IoT based multi-cloud architecture, 
hundreds of cloud users might be using thousands of IoT services across multi-clouds. MC-
IoT has been designed with the goal to enhance secure multi-cloud collaboration and provide 
an advanced development model that can reduce a company’s time-to-market.  
The multi-cloud communication scenario that provides access of IoT services to users across 
multi-clouds is shown in figure A.1. 
Figure A-1 Multi-cloud collaboration scenario where user U1 made a request to MC-IoT in 
local cloud to access service S3 in foreign cloud. The multi-cloud collaboration is setup using 





Based on heterogeneous requirements of multi-clouds and IoT services, MC-IoT can enable 
dynamic collaboration between users and services in multi-clouds. The architecture of MC-IoT 
shown in figure A.1 is based on MCC that has various components implemented in each 
participating cloud to achieve the secure multi cloud authentication, service selection and 
service level agreement (SLA) management discussed in section 4.3.2.   
A.3 Orchestrating Dynamic and Secure Access of E-HealthCare 
Applications across Multi-Clouds Using MCC 
Ubiquitous healthcare using sensor-based e-Healthcare systems has been considered as a future 
of modern healthcare. The healthcare systems include collaborative sharing of e-Health data 
and services which requires new functional elements and provisioning schemes that can be met 
by multi-clouds. However, lack of systems for e-Healthcare usage in multi-clouds can reduce 
the adoption of such systems at large scale. We present a case for using multi-clouds to process 
a large amount of sensor data for e-Healthcare systems and provide a novel model that can be 
used to enable secure data sharing and e-Health services access across multi-clouds. 
A.3.1 Motivation for E-Health Application Access across Multi-Clouds 
Healthcare solutions enable the delivery of healthcare services any required time, however its 
deployment also raises several challenges. The population of people aged over 65 is expected 
to increase in developed countries in the next 20 years, and it will also bring more healthcare 
challenges. Due to rise in healthcare cost, more sophisticated procedures such as e-Healthcare 
are required. Sensor based e-Healthcare systems can monitor patient’s health remotely and 





The Sensors have seen a widespread adoption in medical sector due to increase in healthcare 
costs, and need for healthcare systems in medical diagnosis. Their usage in medical industry 
varies from simple applications like (body temperature measurement) to complex applications. 
Some other types of sensors used in healthcare are pressure, flow, image and bio sensors. 
Sensors play a critical role to increase safety and improve the life quality as they are cost-
effective, accurate, reliable, smart, smaller in size and consume much less energy. Due to these 
characteristics sensors have gained an important place in e-Healthcare applications. The 
sensors market in healthcare is estimated to reach 1.9 billion USD by 2022 [137].  
The use of electronic and communication devices in healthcare is referred to as e-Healthcare. 
Healthcare sensors including implantable, self-powered, bio-sensors, micro-electromechanical 
silicon and nano-sensors can potentially bring huge benefits to e-Healthcare industry in the 
coming years. Some of the benefits offered to patients include remote monitoring of patients 
with chronic illness, helping in treatment of diseases, and monitoring of health statistics by 
patients themselves can help them to steps to improve their health. With the significant 
advantages offered by using sensor data in healthcare, the challenge arises with storing huge 
amount of data generated by sensors. Moreover, e-Healthcare requires data processing, storage 
and analytics that can be potentially be used by collaborative healthcare entities and 
applications.  
Recently, multi-clouds have been proposed as a solution that can potentially solve the problem 
of managing big data in healthcare among collaborative entities [96]. Despite the benefits 
offered by multi-cloud to e-Healthcare sector, there are several key challenges associated with 
the adoption of multi-clouds, particularly healthcare system lack the solutions and frameworks 
that can facilitate its usage. Many healthcare organizations are still hesitant to use cloud due to 




A.3.2 Proposed Model to Access E-HealthCare Applications across Multi-Clouds 
In a cloud hosted healthcare system, cloud acts as a data centre for healthcare centre and it is 
responsible to host all applications, services and data. The user perspective in this case remains 
the same, as they are concerned with traditional health services including e-Health services and 
underlying resources are transparent to them. The proposed architecture for integrating 
healthcare including e-Heath services and sensor-based data with multi-clouds is shown in 
figure. As shown in the figure 1, users including patients and healthcare workers will only need 
to get authenticated by their local cloud and the proposed system will enable them to use 
services in foreign clouds according to requirement. The proposed system design can 
revolutionize the healthcare by providing key benefits such as ability to use multiple e-Health 
services on various platforms, scale computing resources such as storage according to 
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Figure A-2 Proposed e-Healthcare system using multi-clouds 
 
In order to establish multi-cloud collaboration, a new system has been presented. The 
architecture of the proposed system involves various components that have been implemented 
in each participating cloud to achieve the secure multi-cloud authentication and collaboration 
as shown in figure A.2. These components involved in system design are cloud controller, 
cloud manager and authenticator, and how these components handle the communication 
requests coming from foreign clouds is discussed in section 4.3.2.  
A.3.3 Benefits of the Proposed Model 
Multi-cloud system can provide a service based and application-oriented infrastructure that can 
be suitable for e-Healthcare systems due to many reasons including the following:  
• Healthcare workers need inter-organizational and collaborative data sharing  




• Healthcare workers might need to use a e-Health service being run on remote platform 
only for a limited period that will be economically inefficient to be purchased for long 
time 
• Sensors generate a large amount of medical data  
• Number of patient’s records being managed is very large  
• Performing data analytics on large datasets of healthcare needs more resources than 
traditional infrastructure.  
Based on heterogeneous requirements of multi-cloud and e-Healthcare services, the proposed 
can be integrated with healthcare systems resulting in a novel system that can enable dynamic 





























Cloud computing is a technology that offers various services 
ranging from infrastructure to storage, computation, software 
and application over the internet. The aim of cloud computing 
is to better utilize the distributed resources; remotely placed 
together, to grab maximum throughput and to combat large-
scale computational problems.  
 
A multi-cloud environment is dependent on multiple clouds, 
so a user can be reliant on cloud services from AWS, 
Microsoft, or OpenStack which are communicating. Multi-
clouds are considered as a single heterogeneous architecture 
offering on-demand services from multiple cloud providers 
 
A distributed system is a collection of computers working 
together that share states and operate concurrently to act as a 























In this thesis, we refer to a cloud making a connection request 
to an external cloud as a local cloud. Essentially, during 
collaboration it is a cloud in which user making a request to 
access external resources is located. 
 
Foreign cloud is referred to as a cloud to which the user makes 
a connection request. In multi-cloud collaboration, foreign 
cloud has resources to which the user making a request needs 
access.  
 
Orchestration is a term referred to automated arrangements, 
services, management of complex systems and coordination 
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